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Abstract 
In this research, two studies were conducted to examine the factors influencing reliance 
on a decision aid in personnel selection decisions.  Specifically, this study examined the effect of 
feedback, the validity of selection predictors, and the presence of a decision aid on the use of the 
decision aid in personnel selection decisions.  The results of both studies demonstrate that when 
people are provided with the decision aid, their predictions were significantly more similar to 
(but not the same as) the predictions made by the aid than people who were not provided with the 
decision aid.  This suggests that when people are provided with an aid, they will use it at least to 
some degree.  This research also shows that when provided with a decision aid that has high 
validity, people will increase their reliance on the decision aid over multiple decisions.  Finally, 
this research shows that, in general, there are individual differences that influence how 
participants weight the different selection predictors. 
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Chapter 1 - Literature Review 
 Introduction 
Researchers have consistently shown that people are hesitant to rely on decisions aids, 
especially in the form of a statistical model, when making predictions or decisions (Arkes, 
Dawes, & Christensen, 1986; Ashton, 1990; Boatsman, Mockel, & Pei, 1997; Diab, Pui, 
Yankelevich, & Highhouse, 2011; Eastwood, Snook, & Luther, 2012; Fildes & Goodwin, 2007; 
Goodwin, Fildes, Lawrence, & Nikolopoulos, 2007; Sanders & Manrodt, 1994, 2003).  In 
discussing the use, misuse, disuse, and abuse of decision aids, Parasuraman (1997) identified a 
variety of factors that influence one’s decision to use a decision aid.  Specifically, factors such as 
trust in the aid, task complexity, confidence, workload, decision aid accuracy, skill and risk all 
interact to influence one’s use of a decision aid.  Parasuraman also argued that when new 
decision aids are introduced, people may distrust the decision aid and be resistant to accept and 
use it.  For instance, in a series of studies, Dietvorst, Simmons, and Masey (2015a) demonstrated 
that when people see a decision aid make a mistake, they distrust it.  This is known as algorithm 
aversion, in which people are less likely to rely on a decision aid and rely more on their own 
decision processes.  
The purpose of this research is to examine the factors influencing an individual’s reliance 
on a decision aid in a personnel selection context.  Specifically, I examined whether the presence 
of a decision aid (e.g., a statistical model), the validity of selection predictors, and feedback 
regarding one’s performance predictions impacts the reliance on a decision aid.  Study 1 focused 
on examining the effect the presence of the decision aid and the validity of the selection 
predictors on decision aid reliance.  In study 1, participants made ten hiring decisions based on 
2 
data from a real hiring situation.  Study 2 aimed to replicate study 1 and extend it by examining 
the effect of feedback as well as increasing the number of hiring decisions to twenty. 
 Literature Review 
 Personnel Selection 
Personnel selection is one of the primary functions of human resource management 
within organizations and refers to “the process employers use to make decisions concerning 
which individuals from a group to choose for particular jobs or roles within the organization” 
(Farr & Tippins, 2010, p. 1).  At the broadest level, the primary goal of any personnel selection 
system is to assess job candidates on the physical and psychological attributes (knowledge, 
skills, abilities, and other characteristics) that have been identified as being required to perform 
the job in order to identify individuals who will have better performance and improve 
organizational effectiveness and efficiency (Farr & Tippins, 2010; Robertson & Smith, 2001).  
According to the Principles for the Validation and Use of Personnel Selection Procedures, 
validity is the most important aspect to consider when developing, evaluating, and utilizing the 
selection test (Society for Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 2003) because validity 
refers to the degree to which specific interpretations and uses of test scores are supported by 
evidence and theory (American Educational Research Association, American Psychological 
Association, & National Council for Measurement in Education, 1999).  In other words, validity 
refers to the ability of a selection test to predict an applicant’s future job performance, as well as 
other relevant criteria (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998).   
 Effectiveness of Selection Methods 
Because the ability of a test to predict future performance is paramount to personnel 
selection, researchers have spent decades investigating the predictive validity of various 
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constructs as well as assessment methods.  This has allowed researchers to conduct meta-analytic 
studies examining the overall effectiveness of various selection tests, such as cognitive ability 
tests (e.g., Schmidt & Hunter, 1998, 2004), personality tests (e.g., Barrick & Mount, 1991; Tett, 
Jackson, & Rothstein, 1991), and aptitude tests (e.g., Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; Vinchur, 
Schippmann, Switzer III, & Roth, 1998).  Furthermore, these meta-analytic studies have enabled 
researchers to investigate whether some testing methods are more or less effective than others, 
such as unstructured versus structured interviews (e.g., Huffcut & Arthur, 1994).  From these 
meta-analytic studies, several conclusions can be made regarding the overall effectiveness of 
various predictors in selection systems.  First, some of the best predictors of job performance are 
specific aptitude tests, work sample tests, such as a sales ability test, and general cognitive ability 
tests (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998, 2004; Vinchur et al., 1998).  For example, Hunter and Hunter 
(1984) found that work sample tests, which traditionally measure either motor or verbal skills 
(Asher & Sciarrino, 1974), have an average validity of .54, and cognitive ability tests have an 
average validity of .53 when predicting job performance.  More recent meta-analytic work shows 
that the operational validity of work sample tests tends to be slightly lower than originally 
thought with coefficients ranging from .28 to .50 (Roth, Bobko, & McFarland, 2005).  Similarly, 
specific aptitude tests have operational validities ranging from .35 to .50, depending on the 
specific aptitude being measure (Bertua, Anderson, & Salgado, 2005). On the other hand, general 
cognitive ability has been repeatedly shown to be one of the best predictors of job performance 
with operational validity coefficients ranging from .31 to .73 (Schmidt & Hunter, 2004).  
Therefore, when all else is equal, it appears that cognitive ability is the best overall predictor of 
job performance. 
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Second, the operational validities (i.e., the corrected coefficients) of specific personality 
characteristics can predict job performance much better than previously thought (Barrick & 
Mount, 1991; Tett et al., 1991) and in some cases nearly as well as cognitive ability.  This is 
especially true when one considers the relevance between specific traits and specific situations 
(Tett & Guterman, 2000) as well as the effect of bidirectionality on meta-analytic findings (Tett, 
Jackson, Rothstein, & Reddon, 1999).  For example, Barrick, Mount, and Judge (2001) 
demonstrated that conscientiousness has an operational validity of .31 when predicting 
supervisor ratings of job performance.  However, the 90% credibility interval ranges from .11 
to .40, meaning that in some situations, the relationship between conscientiousness and 
supervisor ratings of job performance is near zero, while in other situations, the relationship is 
almost as strong as the relationship between cognitive ability and job performance.  In contrast, 
the operational validities for the remaining four factors of the five-factor model were found to be 
smaller  (.13 for extraversion, .13 for emotional stability, .13 for agreeableness, and .07 for 
openness to experience).  Accordingly, in the context of the five-factor model of personality, 
conscientiousness is the best overall predictor of supervisor ratings of job performance when all 
else is equal.   
Third, and perhaps one of the most important meta-analytic findings about personnel 
selection predictors, structured interviews are far superior to unstructured interviews when 
predicting job performance (Huffcutt & Arthur Jr., 1994; Huffcutt, Culbertson, & Weyhrauch, 
2014; Huffcutt & Culbertson, 2011).  Specifically, the most structured interview format has an 
operational validity of .70, while the least structured interview format has an operational validity 
of .20 (Huffcutt et al., 2014).   
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The fourth and final conclusion that can be made from the meta-analytic evidence is that 
using multiple valid predictors can improve predictions of job performance.  For example, 
Schmidt and Hunter (1998) demonstrated that simply adding conscientiousness to a measure of 
cognitive ability increases the predictive validity by 18% (increase from r = .51 to R = .60).  
Similarly, adding a structured interview to a test of cognitive ability increases the predictive 
validity by 24% (increase from r = .51 to R = .63).  Surprisingly, even adding an unstructured 
interview increases the predictive validity by 8% (increase from r = .51 to R = .55)1.  
In summary, through meta-analytic studies researchers have demonstrated that when all 
other factors are equal cognitive ability and conscientiousness are two of the better predictors of 
job performance.  Similarly, structured interviews are far superior to unstructured interviews, and 
using multiple selection predictors improves the overall validity of selection methods.  
Unfortunately, human resource managers have misperceptions regarding the effectiveness of 
various selection methods. 
 Perceived Effectiveness of Selection Methods 
While research has clearly demonstrated the effectiveness of various selection predictors, 
human resource managers tend to have misperceptions regarding the effectiveness of the various 
selection methods (Highhouse, 2008; Terpstra, 1996).  For example, Terpstra asked 201 human 
resource professionals to rate various selection methods in terms of how well they predict future 
job performance.  He found that the unstructured interview was perceived to be more effective 
                                                
1 It is worth noting that while the addition of the interview can increase the predictive validity of a selection system, 
the interview is a method, not a construct.  This distinction is important because the interview is a tool that can be 
used to assess a variety of different constructs, including cognitive ability.  Furthermore, confusion about the 
distinction between methods and constructs can lead inappropriate conclusions regarding selection tests and 
constructs.  For a detailed argument regarding the importance of the distinction between constructs and methods, see 
Arthur and Villado (2008). 
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than structured interviews, assessment centers, specific aptitude tests, personality tests, general 
cognitive ability tests, and biographical information.  Perhaps most surprising about Terpstra’s 
findings is that general cognitive ability tests were rated as the second worst selection method 
(behind biographical data) for predicting job performance.  The perceptions of these human 
resource professionals do not match the reality of the actual effectiveness of these selection 
predictors.  For example, when predicting performance ratings among salespeople, biographical 
data and general cognitive ability have been meta-analytically shown to be among the best 
predictors of performance (Vinchur et al., 1998), whereas the unstructured interview has been 
shown to be one of the poorer predictors of job performance (Huffcut & Arthur, 1994; Huffcutt 
& Culbertson, 2011).  Figure 1 illustrates these misperceptions.   
 Why Managers Have Misperceptions 
It is clear that human resource professionals have large misperceptions regarding the 
effectiveness of a variety of selection methods.  These misperceptions arise for several reasons.  
First, human resource managers may lack knowledge regarding the effectiveness of these 
predictors, or they may simply be unfamiliar with the predictors altogether (Terpstra & Rozell, 
1997).  Second, human resource professionals may reject the research regarding the effectiveness 
of selection methods because they may not believe that the research is relevant to their own 
hiring situations (Terpstra & Rozell, 1997).  For example, meta-analyses and individual studies 
regarding the effectiveness of selection methods have been conducted for a variety of job 
contexts, such as professionals, police, managers, salespeople, and skilled workers (Barrick & 
Mount, 1991), firefighters (Barrett, Polomsky, & Mcdaniel, 1999), administrative employees 
(Morgeson, Delaney-Klinger, & Hemingway, 2005), and physicians (Lievens & Sackett, 2012).  
However, if a human resource professional is making hiring decisions for janitorial workers, they 
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may reject the research because it does not directly assess the effectiveness of the predictors in 
the context of janitorial work.  As such, hiring managers may be aware of the research findings 
regarding selection predictors, yet they may not be fully convinced by the findings (Colbert, 
Rynes, & Brown, 2005).  A third reason why human resource professionals may have 
misperceptions about the effectiveness of selection predictors is that they believe that good 
hiring is simply a matter of using and relying on one’s intuition (Highhouse, 2008).  As such, it 
is not surprising that hiring managers tend to over-rely on their own decision-making processes, 
such as intuition, when making hiring decisions, instead of relying on the validated selection 
methods. 
While managers tend to over-rely on their own decision processes to make hiring 
decisions, the obvious next question is: Why?  One possible reason is that managers believe it is 
possible to achieve perfect prediction.  Einhorn (1986) argued that clinical approaches to 
judgment and decision making rest on the lofty goal of perfect predictability.  However, because 
statistical models actually accept error as a fundamental assumption and characteristic, they tend 
to produce less error in prediction.  Similarly, Highhouse (2008) argued that managers have 
specific implicit beliefs about personnel selection, one of which is that it is possible to achieve 
perfect prediction regarding job performance.  In other words, managers believe it is possible to 
predict with 100% accuracy an applicant’s job performance based on a handful of selected 
predictors (e.g., cognitive ability, personality, and a work sample).  Indeed, Dawes (1979) 
claimed that one implicit assumption of predicting graduate school performance is that the 
criteria of interest are highly predictable.  As such, people believe that if one method of 
prediction, such as a statistical model, fails to achieve perfect prediction, another (human 
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intuition) may more closely achieve perfect prediction.  However, the evidence fails to support 
these notions.  
Similar to the assumption that it is possible to achieve perfect prediction, people believe 
that intuitive expertise for predicting human behavior actually exists and that they can become 
skilled at making intuitive predictions about performance.  Highhouse (2008) called this the 
“Myth of Expertise.”  This myth is demonstrated in the wide prevalence of clinical (intuitive) 
approaches to managerial assessment (Highhouse, 2002).  However, the preponderance of 
evidence highlights that this belief is actually a myth and the experience does not yield better 
intuitive predictions (Dawes, Faust, & Meehl, 1989; Grove, Zald, Lebow, Snitz, & Nelson, 
2000).  Interestingly, in some situations, such as financial forecasting, the performance of 
novices can match, and sometimes exceed, the performance of experts (e.g., Armstrong, 1980; 
Yates, McDaniel, & Brown, 1991) providing further support that the myth is truly a myth. 
 Intuition 
A recent online book title search on Amazon.com using the term intuition produced 5,881 
search results.  Adding the term business to the search produces still 950 search results.  Some of 
the results include Practical Intuition, The Power of Intuition: How to Use Your Gut Feelings to 
Make Better Decisions at Work, The Invisible Gorilla: How Our Intuitions Deceive Us, and Trust 
Your Gut!: Practical Ways to Develop and Use Your Intuition for Business Success.  Clearly, the 
buying public shows interest in utilizing intuition, improving intuition and counteracting the 
potential negative consequences of intuition.   
This interest is mirrored among organizational scholars.  For example, Highhouse (2008) 
began an academic discussion regarding the managerial overreliance on intuition in personnel 
selection decisions.  This article produced 10 commentaries discussing the issue (Chorągwicka & 
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Janta, 2008; Colarelli & Thompson, 2008; Fisher, 2008; Klimoski & Jones, 2008; Kuncel, 2008; 
Martin, 2008; Mullins & Rogers, 2008; O’Brien, 2008; Phillips & Gully, 2008; Thayer, 2008).  
Furthermore, cognitive science and judgment and decision-making researchers have examined 
how people should make decisions and how people actually make decisions (e.g., Kahneman & 
Tversky, 1979; Tversky & Kahneman, 1981) showing that people often do rely on intuition to 
make decisions (e.g., Kahneman & Klein, 2009).  For example, in personnel selection, research 
clearly demonstrates that hiring managers should utilize mechanical prediction (statistical 
prediction based on validated selection tools) in making hiring decisions (Highhouse, 2008; 
Schmidt & Hunter, 1998).  However, managers tend to ignore information regarding the 
statistically best prediction regarding who should be hired and over-rely on their intuitive 
predictions when making selection decisions (Highhouse, 2008; Slaughter & Kausel, 2014).  
Thus, it comes as no surprise that researchers have often called for research examining ways to 
train hiring managers to utilize valid predictors of job performance instead of relying on intuition 
when making selection decisions.  For example, Slaughter and Kausel (2014) recommended that 
researchers provide direct feedback regarding the accuracy of one’s decision as a possible 
method of demonstrating the fallibility of intuitive decision-making processes.  
In the following sections, I discuss the ways in which intuition has been defined, dual 
information processing theory, the role of intuition in prediction, prediction under uncertainty, 
decision aid use, and the role of feedback in intuitive decision making. 
 Intuition Defined 
As Dane and Pratt (2007) discuss, intuition, especially in the organizational sciences, has 
been defined and operationalized in many different ways causing some confusion about what 
intuition is and how it operates.  For example, Jung (1923) defined intuition as “that 
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psychological function transmitting perceptions in an unconscious way” (emphasis in original, p. 
567-568).  Further, Jung argued that intuition serves an irrational psychological function 
whereby people can have perceptions of situations, objects, problems, and people without any 
knowledge or recollection of how the perception originated. 
Similarly, Simon (1987) described intuition as the process of recognition.  For instance, 
Simon described how expert chess players can play up to 50 opponents simultaneously because 
they are able recognize patterns in the layout of the pieces.  This intuitive recognition enables 
grandmaster chess players to make rapid decisions regarding their next move.  Interestingly, 
these expert players have no awareness of how they make their judgments regarding the moves.  
It seems clear that both Jung (1923) and Simon are describing some form of automatic 
information processing and judgment.  However, Jung described intuition as a psychological 
function and Simon described intuition as the act of recognition.   
More recently, Shapiro and Spence (1997) defined intuition as “a nonconscious, holistic 
processing mode in which judgments are made with no awareness of the rules of knowledge used 
for inference and can feel right despite one’s inability to articulate the reason” (p. 64).  As Dane 
and Pratt (2007) noted, many researchers have clearly defined intuition in their own intuitive 
way.  Upon reviewing the intuition literature, Dane and Pratt (2007) recognized that many of the 
definitions converged in one way or another.  As such, they argued that intuition has four major 
characteristics, and that intuition is a “(1) nonconscious process (2) involving holistic 
associations (3) that are produced rapidly, which (4) result in affectively charged judgments” (p. 
36).  Because the definition Dane and Pratt (2007) used was based on an extensive review of the 
literature, this is the definition adopted in this study.  
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 Dual Information Processing Theory 
According to the dual information processing theory of reasoning, cognitive processing 
occurs in one of two ways (Evans, 2003, 2010).  The first method of information processing, 
referred to as system 1, occurs very rapidly and intuitively and has a large capacity (Evans, 
2010).  Furthermore, system 1 processes are holistic, automatic, unconscious and are less 
cognitively demanding (Stanovich & Toplak, 2012). As can be seen in their definition, intuition 
overlaps conceptually with system 1.  Some have even described system 1 as the intuitive system 
(Evans, 2010).  In contrast, system 2 is much more systematic.  System 2 processes are slow, 
reflective, and have a low capacity.  Further, these processes are analytic, controlled, cognitively 
demanding, and often conscious (Stanovich & Toplak, 2012).  System 1 and system 2 processes 
are thought to be independent (Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005).  In other words, an individual can 
use both systems simultaneously or one system in isolation when making a decision.  Thus, in 
the context of personnel selection, individuals who rely on intuition to make predictions about 
future job performance and to make hiring decisions are relying on the automatic processing 
associated with system 1.  In contrast, when individuals rely on a statistical model to make 
performance predictions and hiring decisions, these individuals are relying on the systematic 
processing associated with system 2.  This study aims to investigate ways to shift information 
processing from system 1 to system 2 when making predictions about future performance of job 
candidates and making hiring decisions.  
 Prediction and Intuition 
Because intuition involves judgments that are automatic, many researchers have been 
concerned with the accuracy of intuitive judgments.  Some argue that, in appropriate situations, 
intuition leads to effective decision making.  For example, when comparing managers’ real-time 
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predictions regarding coupon redemption and product sales to predictions made using statistical 
models, managers’ predictions were as accurate as the predictions of the statistical models 
(Blattberg & Hoch, 1990).  Similarly, expert engineers’ intuitive judgments about the weight 
capacity of highways were more accurate than analytical judgments (Hammond, Hamm, Grassia, 
& Pearson, 1987).   
However, in other situations, the reliance on intuition may be, as Jung (1923) stated, 
irrational and result in suboptimal decision outcomes.  Dawes, Faust, and Meehl (1989) reviewed 
research examining the efficacy of clinical prediction (intuitive human prediction) compared to 
the efficacy of actuarial prediction (statistical prediction) and demonstrated that actuarial 
methods of prediction often predict human behavior better than intuitive methods of prediction.  
Interestingly, this occurred even when experts with greater amounts of information made the 
intuitive predictions.  In a recent meta-analysis, Kuncel, Klieger, Connelly and Ones (2013) 
reviewed the literature comparing clinical and statistical prediction when making judgments 
about future job performance or academic performance.  They demonstrated that using clinical, 
intuitive prediction resulted in a substantial loss in predictive validity when predicting an 
applicant’s job performance or academic performance.  Thus, while some research shows that 
intuition can be effective in some situations, the preponderance of evidence suggests that 
mechanical or statistical prediction often outperforms intuitive prediction (Grove et al., 2000).   
In addition to showing that mechanical prediction is often more accurate than clinical 
prediction, researchers have shown that utilizing a statistical model based on an individual’s 
decision strategies (i.e., a bootstrapped model) often outperforms the individual (Armstrong, 
2001).  While this finding may seem counterintuitive, the model of an individual’s decision 
making strategy uses the decision cue weights in a consistent fashion, whereas the individual 
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may unknowingly adjust the weights for each decision.  The result is that the individual makes 
predictions using inconsistent weighting of the decision cues (Dawes, 1971).  Because the 
bootstrapped model consistently applies the weighting to the decision cues, error in the 
prediction is minimized in the predicted values.  In contrast, when an individual inconsistently 
applies his or her weighting of the decision cues, error in the prediction is not minimized.  For 
example, Dawes (1979) demonstrated that even improper linear models that used equal 
weighting of predictors tend to have higher validity than the average validity of human judges. 
 Is Intuition Intuition? 
To this point, the discussion surrounding intuition has treated intuition as though it is 
something that truly exists, is observable, and can be manipulated.  However, with the present 
technological and methodological abilities, there is no true way of observing or manipulating 
intuition.  Given the inherent non-cognitive nature of intuition and that intuition falls in the 
system 1 type of information processing, it is not possible to observe or measure intuition, yet 
many researchers try to do this ignoring the reality of intuition.  For instance, existing scales 
designed to measure intuition tend to measure intuition as an ability or disposition (e.g., Intuitive 
Management Survey, Rational-Experiential Inventory, & the International Survey on Intuition) 
instead of actual use of intuition (Sinclair & Ashkanasy, 2005).  When used, retrospective 
accounts of intuition enable participants to describe their own perceptions of how they made 
their decision (Dane & Pratt, 2009).  However, retrospective measures are flawed in that if 
intuition exists as a non-cognitive process, an individual has no way of accessing information 
regarding their own intuition.  In attempts to overcome this major measurement issue, other 
researchers have attempted to infer the use of intuition by using alternative measures of intuition.  
For instance, Glöckner (2009) recommended the incorporating the time to make a decision as an 
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additional variable to consider for inferring the use of intuition because intuitive processing, by 
definition, is extremely fast, but so is guessing.  Furthermore, when making inferences regarding 
intuitive processes, one must recognize that intuition is likely often confused with other decision-
making processes.  In the context of personnel selection, instead of relying on intuition or a 
decision aid, an individual may have their own “mental model” that they employ when making 
the decision.  An individual may focus all of their attention on a single predictor, such as 
cognitive ability tests, instead of the combination of predictors.  Similarly, an individual may 
employ a unit weighting strategy, whereby all of the predictors receive the same weight.  An 
individual could also just rely on guessing.  All of these different processes can be, and likely 
are, confused with intuition even among researchers.  In fact, it appears as though researchers 
have lumped all decision processes that deviate from a decision aid or reliance on a statistical 
model as intuition (e.g., Highhouse, 2008).  This is unfortunate for research focusing on intuition 
because it does not truly further our understanding of intuition as a construct or as a decision-
making process. 
 Decision Aid Use 
Researchers have consistently shown that people are hesitant to rely on decisions aids, 
especially in the form of a statistical model, when making predictions or decisions (Arkes et al., 
1986; Ashton, 1990; Boatsman et al., 1997; Diab et al., 2011; Eastwood et al., 2012; Fildes & 
Goodwin, 2007; Goodwin et al., 2007; Sanders & Manrodt, 1994, 2003).  For instance, 
Parasuraman argued that when new decision aids are introduced, people may be resistant to 
accept and use the aids, stating that people may dislike and mistrust the decision aid.  In a series 
of studies, Dietvorst, Simmons, and Masey (2015a) demonstrated that when people see a 
decision aid err, such as a when a statistical model inevitably makes an imperfect prediction, 
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people distrust the decision aid.  In fact, Dietvorst and his colleagues found that people are more 
tolerant of their own larger errors than of the model’s smaller errors.  This results in algorithm 
aversion, in which people are less likely to rely on the model and rely more on their own 
decision processes.  
 Impact of Validity on Decision Aid Use 
One reason why people are hesitant to rely on decision aids is that people believe that 
they are capable of perfect prediction (Highhouse, 2008).  However, it is quite clear from the 
research that people, and for that matter statistical models, do not make perfect predictions, 
especially when predicting human behavior.  The reason is simple: the outcomes being predicted 
(e.g., job performance) are uncertain.  Furthermore, people cannot use all of the possible 
information to make perfect predictions.  To do so would result in information overload.  
Because statistical models are developed by humans who input the information into the models, 
the models are limited by the information they contain.  However, even in the event that a 
manager (or model) is able to predict employees’ job performance with a high degree of 
accuracy, tragedy, such as equipment failure and injured employees, can still strike rendering 
future predictions inaccurate.  Indeed, the “variance in [employee] success is simply not 
predictable prior to employment” (Highhouse, 2008, pp. 335–336).  For instance, if a manager 
makes a prediction about an auto technician’s performance, then the auto technician later 
sustains an injury to his hand, it is highly likely that the manager’s prediction will be quite 
inaccurate.  Therefore, when predicting human behavior, the outcomes are inevitably uncertain, 
and there is the guarantee of error in the prediction. 
While predicting human behavior is an endeavor containing uncertainty, Agor (1986, 
1991) demonstrated that uncertainty is a key factor influencing managerial reliance on intuition.  
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Specifically, he asked 200 executives how managers actually make decisions.  He found that 
almost all of the executives stated that they use intuition to guide decision-making.  Furthermore, 
the executives stated that they relied on intuition most heavily when a high level of uncertainty 
exists (Agor, 1986).  Managers also relied on intuition when outcomes are less scientifically 
predictable, when information is limited, when the information available does not provide clear 
direction on how to proceed, when statistical data have limited utility, and when time pressures 
are greatest.   
Additionally, researchers have demonstrated that the accuracy, or validity, of a decision 
aid influences the use of the decision aid.  For instance, Gomaa, Hunton, Vaassen, and Carree 
(2011) directly manipulated the validity of a decision aid, such that the decision aid participants 
were presented with had an accuracy of 50%, 60%, 70%, 80%, or 90%.  They found that the 
validity of the decision aid significantly impacted its use with more valid decision aids being 
used to a significantly greater extent.  However, this study did not manipulate the presence of the 
decision aid.  Across several studies Dietvorst et al. (2015a) manipulated participants’ experience 
with a decision aid by providing the decision aid’s previous forecasting performance, their own 
previous forecasting performance, previous forecasting performance for both the decision aid 
and their self, or no previous performance.  As previously mentioned, Dietvorst et al. (2015a) 
showed that after viewing the forecasting performance of the decision aid people were less likely 
to use it because they were less tolerant of the decision aid’s smaller errors than their own larger 
errors.  Interestingly, the control condition (no previous performance) consistently utilized the 
decision aid most frequently suggesting that the mere option to use the decision aid led people to 
use the decision aid.  It is only after receiving information about the performance of the decision 
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aid that people distrust it.  All of this information suggests that managers are most likely to rely 
on a decision aid when it has a higher level of validity.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 1: Participants’ hiring choices and performance predictions will more closely 
match those made by the decision aid when the cues are more valid than when they are less 
valid. 
 Presence of a Decision Aid 
However, while much of the research shows that people are averse to using decision aids 
and algorithms, this does not mean that people do not use them at all.  In fact, in four of 
Dietvorst et al.’s (2015a) five studies, the control group that had no prior experience with the 
model used the model 54% - 69% of the time.  Further, after seeing the results of human 
predictions, participants used the model 56% - 76% of the time.  Indeed, in the absence of 
information about the model, participants are using the decision aid (i.e., the statistical model) a 
majority of the time.  It is only when participants are provided with information about the 
inaccuracy of the model that they elect to use the model less.  More convincingly, Dietvorst, 
Simmons, and Masey (2015b) demonstrated across a different series of studies that when people 
are allowed to adjust the predictions made by a statistical model, even if the adjustment is as 
small as two percentiles, people are more likely to use the model.  In fact, after having the 
opportunity to make adjustments to the model’s predictions in an initial set of forecasts, 
participants were more likely to elect to rely entirely on the model in a second set of forecasts 
than participants who could not adjust the predictions in the first set of forecasts.  This suggests 
that people do utilize decision aids; they are just underutilized.  As such, people would be 
expected to rely more on the model than their own decision strategy (i.e. intuition) when simply 
providing people with information about the statistical model and its predictions.  Furthermore, 
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Dietvorst et al. (2015b) convincingly demonstrated that when allowed to adjust the model, they 
are more likely to rely on the model.  Thus, when no explicit restrictions are placed on how one 
uses the model (e.g., whether one can adjust the predictions or whether one must rely strictly on 
the model’s predictions), people should be more likely to rely on the model; they just might 
adjust the predictions.  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 2: Participants’ hiring choice and performance predictions will more closely 
match the choice and performance predictions made by the decision aid when it is provided. 
None of the studies discussed have examined the interactive effects of decision aid 
presence and the validity of predictors on the reliance on a decision aid.  This study will close 
this gap in the literature by examining this interactive effect, and based on the literature 
reviewed, I propose the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: The presence of the decision aid will interact with the validity of the cues, 
such that when the decision aid is present and the cues are more valid, participants’ hiring 
choices and performance predictions will more closely match those made by the decision aid 
than in all other conditions.  
 Feedback 
Despite the evidence showing the superiority of statistical prediction, managerial decision 
makers tend to over-rely on intuition when making personnel selection decisions (Highhouse, 
2008; Slaughter & Kausel, 2014).  Slaughter and Kausel (2014) offered several ways to improve 
personnel selection decisions.  For example, they suggest that because managers may be hesitant 
to ignore their own intuitions and rely entirely on statistical predictions (e.g., Posthuma, 
Morgeson, & Campion, 2002), decision makers should be asked to make specific, numerical 
predictions about job performance.  By making such predictions, decision makers can be 
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provided with feedback regarding the decisions they made.  Feedback regarding an individual’s 
decision allows for the decision maker to become better calibrated to making personnel selection 
decisions and learn from the feedback.   
Feedback regarding an individual’s decision may actually serve as a vital source of 
information in calibrating one’s decision strategies.  Feedback regarding an individual’s decision 
is often operationalized in terms of providing information to a decision maker regarding the 
accuracy (or inaccuracy) of one’s decision (e.g., Louie, 1999; Tuttle & Stocks, 1997).  Such 
feedback has been shown to have dramatic and meaningful influences on individuals’ decision-
making processes.  For example, Louie (1999) demonstrated that individuals who receive 
positive feedback (i.e., the outcome was consistent with an individual’s prediction) regarding 
their decision exhibit a strong hindsight bias, or the tendency to believe the outcome of an event 
was predictable after learning the outcome of the event (Roese & Vohs, 2012).  Additionally, 
Brown (2006) demonstrated that decision feedback has an interactive effect on the relationship 
between outcome uncertainty and decision effectiveness.  More specifically, when decision 
outcomes are less uncertain, decision feedback actually leads to decreases in the effectiveness of 
decision-making strategies.  However, when decision outcomes are more uncertain, decision 
feedback leads to more effective decision-making.   
Decision feedback can also influence the future decision-making strategies a person 
elects to employ.  Using a repeated measures design, Wofford and Goodwin (1990) examined the 
effect of repeated positive feedback and repeated negative feedback on a person’s decision-
making strategies.  When individuals were presented with repeated positive feedback regarding 
their decision-making strategies, decision strategies were maintained.  However, when 
individuals were presented with repeated negative feedback regarding one’s decision-making 
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strategies, individuals tended to change their decision-making strategies and explore alternative 
strategies.  In essence, the feedback was a form of operant conditioning whereby positive 
feedback reinforced a person’s decision strategy and negative feedback punished a decision 
strategy.  Because the negative feedback led to a change in the decision-making strategies 
individuals used, it would be expected that providing negative feedback in the form of 
information about the magnitude of one’s errors would lead them to utilize different decision-
making strategies.   
Hypothesis 4: Participants’ hiring choice and performance predictions will more closely 
match those made by the decision aid when negatively-framed feedback is provided regarding 
their predictions than when no feedback is provided. 
Additionally, it is likely that feedback will interact with the cue validity.  Specifically, 
when the cues have lower validity (the statistical model makes larger errors), people who receive 
feedback may be more likely to rely on their own decision-making processes.  For instance, 
Arkes et al. (1986) examined the effect of different types of feedback on decision aid reliance 
when the decision aid was 70% accurate, which may be considered highly valid.  They found 
that feedback type had a significant effect on decision aid reliance.  However, the validity of the 
decision aid was not manipulated.  Along these lines, Gomaa, Hunton, Vaassen, and Carree 
(2011) demonstrated that when a decision aid is more valid, people tend to utilize the decision 
aid to a greater extent. Conversely, when people receive feedback in the form of information 
about their own forecasting performance, information about a model’s forecasting performance, 
or both, people were more likely to utilize a human forecaster than the model to make additional 
forecasts.  Essentially, after observing a model make mistakes and receiving information about 
the magnitude of those mistakes, people lose trust in the model and instead rely on their own 
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decision-making processes. Furthermore, researchers have directly examined the interactive 
effects of future uncertainty and feedback on optimal decision making strategies.  Specifically, 
when provided with feedback when future outcomes were uncertain, people made less prudent 
decisions than when provided with feedback when the outcomes are not uncertain (Brown, 
2006).  This leads to the following hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 5: The effect of feedback on decision aid reliance will depend on the validity 
of the cues, such that when the cues are more valid and feedback is provided, participants’ hiring 
choices and performance predictions will more closely match those made by the decision aid 
than all other conditions.  
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Chapter 2 - Study 1 
 Purpose 
The purpose study 1 was to examine hypotheses 1 – 3.  In this study, participants were 
presented with applicant information for 10 pairs of job candidates.  For each pair, participants 
were asked to estimate the performance for each candidate and select the candidate who should 
be hired. 
 Operationalization of Decision Aid Reliance 
I utilized three operationalizations of decision aid reliance.  Specifically, I 
operationalized decision aid reliance as the degree of match between a participant’s hire choice 
and the model’s hire choice, the degree of match between a participant’s predicted performance 
and the model’s predicted performance, and the participant’s degree of cue calibration in regards 
to the cue weighting that should be employed to make an optimal decision.  Because statistical 
models are empirically derived and represent the optimal weighting of predictors in a given 
situation, any deviation from the model’s predictions would indicate the lack of reliance on the 
decision aid.  Accordingly, the greater the degree of match in the hire choice, the greater the 
reliance on the decision aid. Similarly, the greater the degree of match in performance 
predictions, the greater the reliance on the decision aid.  It is worth noting that a match in hire 
choice or performance predictions could result for reasons unrelated to reliance on the decision 
aid, such as guessing.  Therefore, I will also examine participant’s cue utilization of the various 
predictors using Brunswik’s (1952) Lens Model to determine whether participants’ weighting of 
the cues represents the optimal weighting strategy.   
According to the Lens Model paradigm, peoples’ understanding of the natural 
environment can be revealed by examining the structure of cues people utilize to make 
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inferences about the state of the environment (Brunswik, 1952, 1955; Cooksey, 1996; Todd & 
Gigerenzer, 2007).  As such, proximal cues are probabilistically related to some distal criterion.  
The relationships between the proximal cues and the distal criterion are known as the ecological 
validities.  By examining the relationship between the values for the proximal cues and an 
individual’s judgments, one can determine the cue utilization validity.  Essentially, one creates a 
bootstrapped model of the individual’s judgment and decision-making policies (Armstrong, 
2001).  One can then compare the individual’s policies or cue utilization to the ecological 
validities to determine the degree to which an individual’s cue usage resembles the optimal 
weighting strategy.  For a detailed review of judgmental bootstrapping, see Armstrong (2001). 
 Method 
 Participants 
One hundred fifty-four participants were recruited from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk 
(MTurk) program.  MTurk originated as a market research platform, but it has since evolved and 
grown into a multidisciplinary research tool.  MTurk is an online crowdsourcing platform that 
enables researchers and organizations to pay people to perform specific tasks, such as 
transcribing audio recordings and selecting among a variety of potential photographs to use in 
advertising.  Another common use of MTurk is as research system that allows researchers from a 
variety of disciplines to recruit participants for their research.  In exchange for their participation, 
participants receive monetary compensation that is specific to each study.  Previous researchers 
have shown that MTurk can be an appropriate tool for recruiting participants.  Specifically, those 
participants recruited using MTurk are more representative of the United States population than 
college students (Paolacci, Chandler, & Ipeirotis, 2010).  Researchers have also demonstrated 
that data obtained through MTurk is similar in quality and reliability to data collected through 
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other means, including undergraduate psychology research pools (Buhrmester, Kwang, & 
Gosling, 2011).  This is particularly the case for basic decision-making processes.  For example, 
Kausel, Culbertson, Leiva, Slaughter, and Jackson (2015) conducted multiple studies examining 
the effects of narcissism on advice taking.  In studies 1 and study 4, Kausel et al. obtained 
samples from an undergraduate population, and in studies 2 and 3, they data were collected from 
MTurk.  Across the four studies, the results from MTurk samples converged with the results 
from undergraduate samples.   
In the present study, participants were paid one US dollar for their participation.  The 
median completion time for participants was 14 minutes.  Approximately 57% of participants 
were male.  The average age of participants was 37.71 (SD = 11.82).  Seventy-three percent were 
Caucasian, and 89% were employed.  For the employed individuals, the average number of hours 
worked per week was M = 40.27 (SD = 9.54).   
Several attention check and screening items were used to help identify those participants 
who were not paying attention and were simply clicking through the survey.  The attention check 
items were, “Are you paying attention right now?  If you are paying attention, select no,” “What 
is the cognitive ability test percentile rank for candidate B,” “Please solve the following math 
equation. 2 + 2 = ?,” “Please enter today’s date,” and “This is an attention check question.  
Please select strongly agree.”  Participants were also asked what their native language is.  Only 
participants who successfully passed at least 3 of the attention check questions and who listed 
English as their native language were included in the final data set.  Additionally, at the end of 
the study, participants were asked, “Is there any reason why we should NOT use your data?”  
Any participant who indicated that his or her data should not be used was also excluded from the 
analyses.  Two participants’ native language was not English; two participants indicated that 
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their data should not be used; and three participants did not successfully pass at least three of the 
attention check questions.  Therefore, these participants were excluded from the analyses. 
 Materials and Procedure 
 Decision task.  The decision task that was used in this study is an adapted version of the 
decision task used by Kausel, Culbertson and Madrid (under review).  In this task, participants 
were presented with applicant information for the position of a ticket checker with an airline 
company in which all of the applicants used in this study were eventually hired.  The airline 
company used a test of cognitive ability, a personality test that measured conscientiousness, and 
an unstructured interview to make their hiring decisions.  Therefore, participants were presented 
with applicants’ percentile scores on a cognitive ability measure, a measure of conscientiousness, 
and an unstructured interview.  Participants were asked to predict the performance of both 
candidates in each decision.  More specifically, participants were asked to provide an estimate of 
the candidates’ performance percentile rank from 0 (will perform worse than all other 
employees) to 100 (will perform better than all other employees).  Participants were then asked 
to select the candidate that the airline company should hire.   
Feedback information.  All participants were provided with feedback regarding their 
predictions and hiring choices after each decision.  Participants were shown what their original 
predictions were.  They were also shown the job performance of both candidates once they were 
hired as determined by the cue validity manipulation.  Last, participants were shown what their 
prediction error was for each candidate’s performance.  As such, participants were provided with 
negative performance feedback to the extent that their predictions differed from the candidates’ 
performance.  In study 1, I did not manipulate feedback; the feedback manipulation was 
introduced in study 2.  
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Cue validity manipulation.  In order to examine the effect of cue validity on 
participants’ reliance on the decision aid, participants were randomly assigned to either a high 
validity condition or a moderate validity condition.  In other words, participants were either 
assigned to a condition in which the job candidates’ eventual performance once hired is highly 
predictable from an appropriate weighting of the three predictors (cognitive ability, 
conscientiousness, and unstructured interview), or participants were assigned to a condition in 
which the job candidates’ eventual performance is less predictable from an appropriate weighting 
of the three predictors.   
The weighting of the predictors in both conditions was .50 for cognitive ability, .40 for 
conscientiousness, and .10 for the unstructured interview.  These weights were selected based on 
the results of meta-analyses (e.g., Huffcutt & Arthur, 1994, Schmidt & Hunter, 1998).  
Furthermore, these weights were selected such that when summed, the result would produce an 
estimate of performance in percentile units.  The weights were then summed, and random error 
was introduced using a logistic function in which random error was either small or large, 
depending on the condition.  The predicted performance was then rounded to the nearest integer 
to simplify the solution.  Thus, the model used to create the high valididty condition was: 
Equation 1 
 𝑦! = 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 . 50 ∗ 𝑥! + .40 ∗ 𝑥! + .10 ∗ 𝑥! + !!~!(!,!)! ∗ 100)  
Where yp represents the candidate’s eventual performance in the high validity condition. 
Similarly, the model used to create the moderate validity condition was: 
Equation 2 𝑦!" = 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑((𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 . 50 ∗ 𝑥! + .40 ∗ 𝑥! + .10 ∗ 𝑥! + 𝑥!~𝑁(0,1) ∗100)  
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Where ylp represents the candidate’s eventual performance in the moderate validity 
condition.  In both equations, x1 represents the candidate’s cognitive ability score, x2 represents 
the candidate’s conscientiousness score, and x3 represents the candidate’s interview score.  
Additionally, xr ~ N(0,1) represents the value randomly sampled from a standard normal 
distribution.   
In order to determine the actual validity of the cues once the random error has been 
introduced in the eventual performance of the candidates, the candidates’ test scores were used to 
predict their eventual performance.  The model used to predict the candidates’ eventual 
performance used the same weighting used in Equations 1 and 2.  Therefore, the formula used to 
predict the candidates’ eventual performance was: 
Equation 3 𝑦 = .50 ∗ 𝑥! + .40 ∗ 𝑥! + .10 ∗ 𝑥! 
Where 𝑦 = the predicted eventual performance for the candidate.  In the high cue validity 
condition, equation 3 resulted in an R2 = .962.  In the moderate cue validity condition, equation 3 
resulted in an R2 = .504.  This confirms that the conditions represent situations in which the 
selection predictors are highly valid and moderately valid, respectively. 
Decision aid manipulation.  Participants were randomly assigned to one of two 
conditions in which a decision aid was either present or absent.  In the decision aid present 
condition, participants were provided information about the validity of the three predictors and 
information regarding a statistical model that should be used to predict job performance of the 
candidates.  In the decision aid absent condition, participants did not receive any information 
regarding the validity of the three selection predictors or the model.  
Participants were asked to utilize the candidates’ scores to estimate the candidates’ 
performance as well as select one of the candidates to hire.  For participants in the decision aid 
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present condition, participants were presented with equation 3, but they were not provided with 
the results of the calculations for each candidate.  Instead, participants were only presented with 
the result of the validity weights multiplied by the predictor scores.  Thus, participants would 
still be required to add the three weighted predictor scores.  The rationale for this was that 
participants who engaged in more systematic information processing (i.e., relied more on the 
statistical model’s prediction) would actually add these scores.  Thus, their predictions should 
match the predictions made by the model.  In contrast, individuals who engaged in more 
automatic information processing would not rely on the information provided by the model.  
Instead, they would rely on their own decision-making processes to make their predictions, 
which would likely result in predictions that do not match the predictions made by the model.  
The stimuli presented to participants are displayed in Appendix A. 
 Results 
Because reliance on the decision aid is operationalized in three different ways, three 
separate analyses were conducted.  
 Match in Hire Choice  
In order to examine reliance on the decision aid based on a match between the 
participant’s hire choice and the model’s hire choice, a repeated measures logistic regression was 
conducted using the generalized liner mixed-effects modeling package in R (Bates, Maechler, 
Bolker, & Walker, 2014).  The cue validity, decision aid presence, trial, and their interactions 
were entered as fixed effects.  Because it is possible that participant’s trial slopes may differ at 
each decision, two models were compared.  In the first model (model 1), trial was entered only as 
a fixed effect.  In the second model (model 1a) trial was entered as a fixed effect and as a random 
effect.  In both models, the intercept was included as a random effect.  The match in hire choice 
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was entered as the dependent variable and was coded as 1 = match, 0 = no match.  In order to 
reduce the effects of multicollinearity between the main effects and the interactions, the 
predictors were centered before being entered into the model.  Cue validity and decision aid 
presence were both centered using effects coding, such that for cue validity 1 = high cue validity 
and -1 = moderate cue validity, and for decision aid presence 1 = decision aid is present and -1 = 
decision aid is not present.  Trial was mean centered.  
In order to determine the best fitting model, the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC), the 
Bayesian Information Criterion (BIC), and the log likelihood model fit indices were examined.  
For the AIC and BIC, the model with smaller values is a better fitting model.  Similarly, for the 
log likelihood the model with the larger negative value is the better fitting model.  Occasionally, 
the fit indices will provide slightly conflicting information.  In the event of conflicting 
information, the AIC will be used as the criterion of fit because the AIC uses savvy prior 
probabilities in its calculation, whereas the BIC does not (Burnham & Anderson, 2004).  Model 
1 (AIC = 1340, BIC = 1388, log likelihood = -661) appeared to be a better fitting than model 1a, 
AIC = 1341, BIC = 1400, log likelihood = -659.  Furthermore, the addition of trial as a random 
effect did not produce a significantly better fitting model, χ2(2) = 3.276, p = .194.  Therefore, the 
best fitting model does not include trial as a random effect.  Accordingly, the results of model 1 
are reported.   
The results of model 1 are displayed in Figure 2.  The results of model 1 showed a 
significant main effect of model presence, B = 0.453, z = 5.126, p < .001.  When model 
information was provided, participants’ hire choices were significantly more likely to match the 
model’s hire choices than when model information was not provided.  There was not a 
significant main effect of cue validity (B = 0.053, z = 0.604, p = .546) or trial (B = 0.025, z = 
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0.963, p = .336).  Further, none of the interactions were significant, ps ≥ .12.  Table 1 displays 
the parameter estimates, standard errors, z-values, and p-vales for the model predicting match in 
hiring choice. 
 Match in Predicted Performance 
In order to examine reliance on the decision aid based on a match between the 
participant’s predictions about the candidates’ performance and the model’s performance 
predictions, a repeated measures linear regression was conducted using the linear mixed-effects 
modeling package in R (Bates et al., 2014).  Cue validity, decision aid presence, trial, and their 
interactions were entered as fixed effects.  Because it is possible that participant’s slopes may 
differ at each decision, two models were compared.  In the first model (model 2), trial was 
entered only as a fixed effect.  In the second model (model 2a) trial was entered as a fixed effect 
and as a random effect.  The absolute value of the difference between participants’ performance 
predictions for each candidate and the model’s performance predictions for each candidate was 
used as the dependent variable.  However, because the absolute value of difference scores results 
in highly positively skewed data, the variable was log transformed using the natural log.  In order 
to reduce the effects of multicollinearity between the main effects and the interactions, the 
predictors were centered before being entered into the model.  The same centering procedures 
that were used for the first analysis were in this second analysis.  
Model 2 was a significantly better fitting model than model 2a, χ2(2) = 12.998, p = .002. 
Furthermore, by examining the fit indices, it appeared that model 2 (AIC = 12091, BIC = 12152, 
log likelihood = -6036) was a better fitting than model 2a, AIC = 12081, BIC = 12154, log 
likelihood = -6029.  Therefore, the best fitting model does not include trial as a random effect.  
Accordingly, the results of model 2 are reported.   
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The results of model 2 are displayed in Figure 3.  The results of model 2 revealed a 
significant main effect of cue validity, B = -0.368, t(3071) = -2.932, p < .05.  Participants in the 
high validity condition made performance predictions that were significantly more similar to the 
model’s predictions than participants in the moderate validity condition.  The results also 
revealed a significant main effect of decision aid presence (B = -0.750, t(3071) = -5.970, p 
< .05), such that when provided with the decision aid participants’ performance predictions were 
significantly more similar to the model’s predictions than participants who were not provided 
with the decision aid.  Further, these main effects were qualified by a significant interaction, such 
that the effect of the cue validity is stronger when the decision aid (B = -0.675) was provided 
than when it was not provided, B = -0.061.  There was not a significant main effect of trial (B = -
0.003, t(3071) = -0.340, p > .05), and none of the interactions with trial were significant, ps 
> .05.  Table 2 displays the parameter estimates, standard errors, and t-values for the model 
predicting the match in candidate performance predictions. 
 Cue Utilization 
Finally, in order to examine reliance on intuition based on how participants relied on the 
various cues, a repeated measures logistic regression was conducted using the generalized liner 
mixed-effects modeling package in R (Bates et al., 2014).  However, in this final set of analyses, 
because the goal is to examine how participants are utilizing the various predictor cues to make 
their hiring choice, the differences between the job candidates’ selection predictor scores 
(difference between cognitive ability for candidate A and the cognitive ability for candidate B, 
difference between conscientiousness for candidate A and the conscientiousness for candidate B, 
difference between the unstructured interview for candidate A and the unstructured interview for 
candidate B) were used to predict the participants’ hire choice in each decision.  Additionally, 
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cue validity, decision aid presence, and their interactions were included as predictors.  Because it 
is possible that participant’s slopes may differ at each decision and as a function of the difference 
between the two candidates’ the selection predictors, multiple models were examined.  In order 
to reduce the effects of multicollinearity between the main effects and the interactions, the 
predictors were centered before being entered into the model.  The same centering procedures 
that were used for the first and second analyses were in this final analysis.  The differences 
between the job candidates’ selection predictor scores were also mean centered. 
A summary of the structure of the two best fitting models is displayed in Table 3.  Model 
3  (AIC = 1024, BIC = 1120, log likelihood = -494) was a better fitting model than model 3a, 
AIC = 1031, BIC = 1169, log likelihood = -489.  Furthermore, the inclusion of cue validity and 
its interactions as fixed effects did not produce a significantly better fitting model, χ2(12) = 
18.800, p = .093.  Therefore, the results for model 3 are reported.  
The results of model 3 are displayed in Table 4.  As can be seen in the table, the 
difference between candidates’ cognitive ability scores (B = 0.158, z = 5.718, p < .001), 
conscientiousness scores (B = 0.114, z = 5.639, p < .001), and interview scores (B = .091, z = 
5.075, p < .001) all significantly predicted the participant’s hiring choice.  There was not a 
significant main effect of decision aid presence in predicting the participant’s hiring choice,  
B = -0.148, z = -0.978, p = .328.  However, there was a significant interaction between decision 
aid presence and the difference between candidates’ cognitive ability scores and 
conscientiousness scores.  Specifically, the slope for the difference between candidates’ 
cognitive ability scores was B = 0.201 for the decision aid present condition and B = 0.114 for 
the decision aid absent condition.  Similarly, the slope for the difference between candidates’ 
conscientiousness scores was B = .133 in the decision aid present condition and B = 0.096 in the 
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decision aid absent condition.  There was not a significant interaction between decision aid 
presence and the difference between candidates’ interview scores. 
Based on the results of model 3, it appears that there is differential weighting of the cues 
based on the presence of the decision aid, at least for cognitive ability and conscientiousness.  
Because the results of model 3 represent the cue weighting for a binomial choice (hire candidate 
A vs. hire candidate B), the optimal weights cannot be compared to the optimal weights 
presented in equation 3.  In order to determine if the weights participants are using represent 
optimal weighting, a Monte Carlo simulation was conducted in which the differences between 
the three selection predictors for 10,000 job candidate pairs were generated.  The differences 
between the three selection predictors for each pair were then entered into equation 3 to 
determine the candidate that the statistical model would select.  Because the values entered into 
the formula were difference scores, a positive value would favor candidate A, and a negative 
value would favor candidate B.  The differences between the three selection predictors for the 
10,000 pairs were then used to predict the hire choice (candidate A vs. candidate B).  The 
resulting model yields the optimal weighting for the three selection predictors.  Specifically, the 
optimal weights were B = 0.189 for cognitive ability, B = 0.150 for conscientiousness, and B = 
0.038 for the unstructured interview.  
Figure 4 displays the optimal cue weighting, participants’ weighting of the three cues in 
the decision aid present condition, and the participants’ weighting of the three cues in the 
decision aid absent condition.  As can be seen in the figure, the participants who received the 
decision aid appeared to have a cue utilization that approximates the optimal cue weighting.  As 
such, these participants were well calibrated, suggesting that participants relied on the decision 
aid that was provided to make their predictions regarding the candidates’ performance.  In 
34 
contrast, the figure shows that participants who did not receive the decision aid appear to have a 
cue utilization that differs largely from the optimal cue weighting.  The participants were poorly 
calibrated utilizing essentially a unit weighting decision strategy, which suggests that participants 
were relying on their own decision-making processes.  This also serves as a comparison group 
because it shows that people do change their decision-making strategy when provided with a 
decision aid.  
 Exploratory Cluster Analysis 
Given the width of the error bars around the cue weighting participants’ used, an 
exploratory cluster analysis was conducted to examine whether there may be the presence of 
individual differences in how participants are weighting the cues.  Specifically, a Ward 
hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted using the JMP Pro 12 software for the decision aid 
present and decision aid not present conditions.  The results of the cluster analysis are displayed 
in Figures 5 and 6.  As can be seen in Figure 5, two clusters emerged when the decision aid was 
provided.  The first cluster contained 58 individuals, and the second cluster contained 17 
individuals.  The first cluster approximates the optimal weighting of the cues.  However, the 
second cluster uses a cue weighting that is quite different from the optimal weighting, such that 
cognitive ability had a weighting of B = 0.044, conscientiousness had a weighting of B = 0.025, 
and the unstructured interview had a weighting of B = 0.069.  Thus, participants in cluster 2 used 
an approximate unit weighting system with the unstructured interview having the most weight. 
As can be seen in Figure 6, three clusters emerged when the decision aid was not 
provided.  The first cluster contained 12 individuals, the second cluster contained 48 individuals, 
and the third cluster contained 19 individuals.  The second cluster had weighting that was similar 
to the optimal weighting of the cues.  However, the first and third clusters used cue weights that 
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are quite different from the optimal weighting.  For the first cluster, cognitive ability had a 
weighting of B = 0.048, conscientiousness had a weighting of B = 0.046, and the unstructured 
interview had a weighting of B = 0.007.  The participants in this cluster appeared to weight 
cognitive ability and conscientiousness equally and weighted the interview lower.  Finally, 
participants in cluster 3 gave the most weight to cognitive ability (B = 0.120) and the 
unstructured interview (B = 0.113) and gave the least weight to conscientiousness (B = 0.067).  
Based on the results of the cluster analysis, it is apparent that there are individual differences in 
how people are weighting the different predictors, regardless of whether the decision aid was 
provided or not. 
 Summary of Results and Discussion 
The purpose of this study was to examine the interactive effects of decision aid presence 
and cue validity on reliance on a decision aid over a series of hiring decisions.  As such, this 
study sought to test hypotheses 1 – 3.  Hypothesis 1 stated that participants’ hiring choices and 
performance predictions would more closely match those made by the decision aid when the 
cues were more valid than when they were less valid.  In the analysis that examined the match in 
hiring choices, cue validity was not a significant predictor.  However, in the analysis that 
examined the match in performance predictions, cue validity was a significant predictor, such 
that when the cues had higher validity, there was a greater degree of match between participants’ 
performance predictions and the model’s performance predictions.  Therefore, hypothesis 1 was 
partially supported.  Hypothesis 2 stated that participants’ hiring choices and performance 
predictions would more closely match the choice and performance predictions made by the 
decision aid when it is provided.  When examining the degree of match in hiring choices and the 
degree of match in performance predictions, the presence of the decision aid was a significant 
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predictor, thus supporting hypothesis 2.  The third hypothesis was concerned with the interaction 
between the presence of the decision aid and the validity of the cues.  Only when examining the 
degree of match in performance predictions was the interaction significant, such that the greatest 
degree of match in performance predictions occurred when the decision aid was provided and the 
cues were highly valid.  Therefore, hypothesis 3 was partially supported.  
The results of this study show that, when making a hiring choice, providing a decision aid 
leads to greater reliance on the decision aid regardless of the validity of the cues.  However, the 
results of this study also demonstrate that when making specific performance predictions, 
reliance on the decision aid is greater if the validity of the cues is high.  These results suggest 
that simply providing a decision aid for practitioners to use will lead to reliance on the decision 
aid.  The results of the analysis that examined participants’ cue weighting suggest that when the 
decision aid is provided, participants’ are using a weighting system that approximates the 
optimal weighting used by the decision aid.  However, participants’ weighting of the predictors 
was not identical to the optimal weighting, which suggests that while participants are using the 
decision aid, they may be adjusting the weights in some way.  Therefore, when provided with a 
decision aid in a personnel selection context, participants used the aid but they did not rely on it 
entirely.  When examining the results of the cluster analysis, it is quite clear that there are 
individual differences in how participants are weighting the selection predictors, regardless of 
whether the decision aid was provided or not.  
Interestingly, the results also show that there was no significant effect of decision trial, 
suggesting that there was no learning effect over time.  However, this may be the case because 
participants were asked to only make ten decisions.  Thus, their experience within the context of 
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this study was rather limited.  Study 2 used a greater number of trials to examine whether there is 
any learning effect over time.   
Study 1 sought to test hypotheses 1 – 3, excluding the effects of feedback.  Study 2 was 
conducted to replicate study 1 and test hypotheses 4 and 5.  In order to examine hypotheses 4 and 
5, the study 2 directly manipulated the presence of feedback.  
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Chapter 3 - Study 2 
Study 2 was similar to study 1 with a few notable exceptions.  First, study 2 utilized 
twenty decision trials instead of ten trials.  In study 1, small, albeit non-significant, effects of 
decision trial were present.  Therefore, I examined how reliance on the decision aid would shift 
over a longer period of time.  Second, because most selection environments have cues that are 
collectively much less predictable than R2 = .962 or .504, I introduced a third cue validity 
condition, one in which the validity of the cues is much lower and represents the validity of 
realistic hiring situations, R2 = .204.  Third, I manipulated feedback.  In study 1, all participants 
received feedback regarding their decision in the form of error feedback.  In study 2, feedback 
was manipulated, such that half of the participants received feedback while the other half did not 
receive any feedback.  Thus, the resulting design of the study 2 is a 2 (model information 
provided versus no model information provided) x 3 (high cue validity, moderate cue validity, 
realistic cue validity) x 2 (error feedback provided or no error feedback provided) mixed design 
with trial as a within subjects variable.  The fourth and final change from study 1 is that a fourth 
cue was added: handwriting analysis.  Handwriting analysis, also referred to as graphology, has 
been shown to be an invalid predictor of job performance (Neter & Ben-Shakhar, 1989; Reilly & 
Chao, 1982; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998).  Despite being a poor predictor of job performance, in 
some European countries, graphology is widely used.  For instance, in France approximately 
93% of companies use handwriting analysis in personnel selection (Bruchon-Schweitzer & 
Ferrieux, 1991).  The prevalence of the use of graphology in France has led to the emergence of 
a myth surrounding graphology.  Specifically, the myth is that “graphology is a frequently used 
and valued selection method in European countries” (Bangerter, Ko, Blatti, & Salvisberg, 2009, 
p. 219).  As Bangerter et al. argue, this myth may be based on the notion that some companies 
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require handwritten application letters.  However, the evidence suggests that graphology is not as 
widely used, as one would expect.  For instance, since 2000 less than 1% of job ads in 
Switzerland require a handwritten application letter (Bangerter et al., 2009).  Interestingly, 
22.2% of the time, the purpose of handwritten application letters is to analyze handwriting.  
Regardless of whether graphology is used 10% of the time or 90% of the time, the lack of 
validity evidence supporting its use would suggest than any use of graphology is overuse.  Given 
that handwriting analysis is used in some places around the world despite that lack of validity 
evidence supporting its use, handwriting analysis was added as a fourth predictor to determine 
whether participants’ cue weighting strategies can accommodate a cue that has a near-zero 
relationship with job performance.  
 Method 
 Participants 
Five hundred nineteen hiring professionals were recruited using Qualtrics participant 
panels.  In order to participate in this study, participants were required to have a minimum of one 
year of hiring experience.  In this sample, participants had an average of 7.70 (SD = 6.69) years 
of hiring experience.  Furthermore, 93% of the sample was currently employed, and those who 
were employed worked an average of 42.99 (SD = 10.01) hours per week.  The average age of 
participants was 38.96 (SD = 11.33).  Approximately 52% of the participants were female.  
Eighty percent were Caucasian.  The median completion time for participants was 18 minutes.   
Like in study 1, several attention check questions and screening questions were used.  
The same attention check items that were used in study 1 were used in study 2.  However, 
because the data was collected using the Qualtrics participant panels, any participant who failed 
a single attention check question was excluded.  Additionally, any participant whose native 
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language was not English was excluded.  Because participants were removed from the data prior 
to Qualtrics sending the final sample, it is not known how many participants failed attention 
checks or how many were excluded because English is not their native language.  However, like 
in study 1, participants were asked if there was any reason their data should not be used.  Based 
on their responses, twenty participants were excluded from the analyses.  
 Materials and Procedure 
Decision task.  This study used the same decision task that was used in study 1.  
However, instead of making 10 selection decisions, participants were asked to make 20 selection 
decisions.  The increase in the number of decisions allowed for a better examination of how 
participants’ decision strategies change over time.  The ordering of the 20 decisions were 
randomized to reduce the effects of ordering and to examine the changes over time.  
Cue validity manipulation.  Like in study 1, participants were randomly assigned to the 
cue validity conditions.  However, because reality is much less predictable, a third condition was 
added.  Schmidt and Hunter (1998) demonstrated that the addition of a single predictor to 
cognitive ability yielded coefficients ranging from R2 = .260 to R2 = .423.  While Schmidt and 
Hunter demonstrated that the predictive power of multiple predictors approaches an R2 = .500, it 
is worth noting that their calculations included corrections for attenuation, such as range 
restriction.  When examining the observed validities in a multiple predictor selection system, the 
validities will be lower.  For example, Jacobs, Conte, Day, Silva, and Harris (1996) conducted a 
job analysis and identified six relevant job predictors.  Using a composite of the identified 
predictors, they demonstrated that the six predictors relatively modest predictive power with R2 
ranging from .01 to .09, depending on the performance criterion used.   
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Because the predictability of actual employee behavior can be substantially smaller than 
the moderate validity condition from study 1, participants were randomly assigned to either the 
high cue validity condition (R2 = .962), the moderate cue validity condition (R2 = .504), or the 
realistic cue validity condition (R2 = .204).  In order to create the realistic cue validity condition, 
the same procedures used to create the high validity and the moderate validity conditions were 
used to create the realistic validity condition.  However, a greater degree of random error was 
introduced to produce an environment that more closely matched the validity of predictors of job 
performance in real business settings.  Thus, the formula used to create the realistic cue validity 
was: 
Equation 4 𝑦! = 𝑟𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑(𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑠𝑡𝑖𝑐  𝑝𝑒𝑟𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡 . 50 ∗ 𝑥! + .40 ∗ 𝑥! + .10 ∗ 𝑥! + .0 ∗ 𝑥! + 1.5 ∗(𝑥!~𝑁 0,1 ) ∗ 100)  
Where yr represents the candidate’s eventual performance in the realistic condition, x1 
represents the candidate’s cognitive ability score, x2 represents the candidate’s conscientiousness 
score, x3 represents the candidate’s interview score, and x4 represents the candidate’s handwriting 
analysis score.  Additionally, xr ~ N(0,1) represents the value randomly sampled from a standard 
normal distribution.   
In order to determine the actual validity of the cues once the random error has been 
introduced in the eventual performance of the candidates, the candidates’ test scores were used to 
predict their eventual performance.  The formula used to predict the candidates’ eventual 
performance was: 
Equation 5 𝑦 = .50 ∗ 𝑥! + .40 ∗ 𝑥! + .10 ∗ 𝑥! + .00 ∗ 𝑥! 
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Using equation 5 to predict the eventual performance of candidates in the realistic 
validity condition resulted in R2 = .204.  
The stimuli that were presented to the participants are displayed in Appendix B.  
Decision aid presence manipulation.  The same decision aid presence manipulation that 
was utilized in study 1 was used in this study.  Thus, participants were randomly assigned to 
receive decision aid or not receive the decision aid.  
Feedback information.  One purpose of the present study was to examine the effect of 
feedback on reliance on intuition.  In contrast to study 1, participants in study 2 were randomly 
assigned to receive feedback regarding their performance predictions and hiring choices after 
each decision or not receive any feedback regarding their performance predictions and hiring 
choices.  Those assigned to the feedback condition were shown what their original performance 
predictions were, the actual job performance of both candidates once they were hired, and their 
prediction error for each candidate’s performance.  Participants assigned to not receive feedback 
did not receive any feedback regarding what their original performance predictions were, the 
actual job performance of both candidates once they were hired, or their prediction error for each 
candidate’s performance. 
 Results 
To test the hypotheses, the analytical approach was similar to the approach used in study 
1, with three exceptions.  The number of trials increased from ten to twenty.  Study 2 included 
the additional cue validity condition, and feedback was manipulated.  Accordingly, these 
changes were incorporated into the analytical procedures. 
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 Match in Hire Choice   
In order to examine utilization of the decision aid based on a match between the 
participant’s hire choice and the hire choice made by the model, a repeated measures logistic 
regression was conducted using the generalized liner mixed-effects modeling package in R 
(Bates et al., 2014).  Cue validity, model presence, the presence of feedback, trial, and their 
interactions were entered as fixed effects.  While study 1 demonstrated that participants’ slopes 
did not differ at each decision, this may have occurred because there were not enough decisions 
to demonstrate any learning effects.  Therefore, because it is possible that participant’s slopes 
may differ at each decision with the increased number of decisions, three models were compared.  
In the first model (model 4), trial was not included in the model because trial was not a 
significant predictor in study 1.  Additionally, the exclusion of trial from the model creates a 
model with fewer parameters, which should reduce the risk of overfitting the model.  In the 
second model (model 4a), trial was entered as a fixed effect, and in the third model (model 4b) 
trial was entered as a fixed effect and as a random effect.  The match in hire choice was entered 
as the dependent variable and was coded as 1 = match, 0 = no match.  In order to reduce the 
effects of multicollinearity between the main effects and the interactions, the categorical 
predictors were centered using effects coding, and trial was mean centered.  
Like in study 1, the AIC, BIC, and log likelihood model fit indices were examined to 
determine the best fitting model.  Because these indices may occasionally provide conflicting 
information, the model with the smallest AIC values was selected as the better fitting model (see 
Burnham & Anderson, 2004).  Model 4 (AIC = 10502, BIC = 10596, log likelihood = -5238) 
appeared to be a better fitting than model 4a (AIC = 10511, BIC = 10692, log likelihood = -5231) 
or model 4b, AIC = 10512, BIC = 10708, log likelihood = -5229.  The addition of trial as a fixed 
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effect did not produce a significantly better fitting model (χ2(12) = 14.546, p = .267), nor did the 
addition of trial as a fixed effect and random effect produce a significantly better fitting model, 
χ2(2) = 2.775, p = .250.  Therefore, the best fitting model does not include trial.  Accordingly, the 
results of model 4 are reported. 
The results of model 4 are displayed in Figure 7.  The results of model 4 showed that 
there was not a significant main effect of cue validity on whether participants’ hiring choices 
matched the model’s hiring choices, F(2, 507) = 0.286, p = .752.  However, there was a 
significant main effect of decision aid presence, B = 0.152, z = 3.95, p < .001.  When the 
decision aid was provided, participants’ hire choices were significantly more likely to match the 
model’s hire choices than when model information was not provided.  Additionally, there was a 
significant main effect of feedback on whether participants’ hiring choices matched the model’s 
choices, B = -0.085, z = -2.22, p = .027.  When feedback was provided, participants’ hiring 
choices were significantly less likely to match the model’s choices.  Finally, none of the 
interactions were significant, ps ≥ .067.  Table 5 displays the parameter estimates, standard 
errors, z-values, and p-vales for the model predicting match in hiring choice.  
 Match in Performance Predictions 
In order to examine reliance on the decision aid based on a match between the 
participant’s predictions about the candidates’ performance and the model’s performance 
predictions, a repeated measures linear regression was conducted using the linear mixed-effects 
modeling package in R (Bates et al., 2014).  Cue validity, decision aid presence, feedback, trial, 
and their interactions were entered as fixed effects.  As with the previous analyses, three models 
were examined.  In model 5, trial (and its interactions) was not included as either a fixed effect or 
random effect.  In model 5a, trial was included as a fixed effect only, and in model 5b, trial was 
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included as both a fixed effect and random effect.  The absolute value of the difference between 
participants’ performance predictions for each candidate and the model’s performance 
predictions for each candidate was used as the dependent variable.  However, because the 
absolute value of difference scores results in highly positively skewed data, the variable was log 
transformed using the natural log.  In order to reduce the effects of multicollinearity between the 
main effects and the interactions, the predictors were centered before being entered into the 
model using the same procedures in the previous analysis.  
Model 5a was a significantly better fitting model than model 5 (χ2(12) = 170.51, p < .001) 
and model 5b was a significantly better fitting model than model 5a, χ2(2) = 534.09, p < .001.  
Furthermore, by examining the fit indices, it appeared that model 5b (AIC = 72611, BIC = 
72833, log likelihood = -36278) was a better fitting than model 5a (AIC = 73141, BIC = 73348, 
log likelihood = -36545) and model 5, AIC = 73288, BIC = 73399, log likelihood = -36630.  
Therefore, the best fitting model includes trial as both a fixed effect and a random effect.  
Accordingly, the results of model 5b are reported.   
As in the analyses examining match in hire choice, the results showed that there was not 
a significant effect of cue validity on the degree of similarity in participants’ performance 
predictions and the model’s performance predictions, F(2, 507) = 1.221, p = .296.  In contrast to 
the analyses examining the match in hiring choice, there was not a significant main effect of 
feedback, B = .045, t(20719) = 0.86, p > .05.  However, the results did reveal a significant main 
effect of decision aid presence (B = -0.534, t(20719) = -10.13, p < .05), such that when provided 
with the decision aid participants’ performance predictions were significantly more similar to the 
model’s performance predictions than participants who were not provided with the decision aid.  
There was also a significant main effect of trial (B = -0.015, t(20719) = -4.78, p < .05), such that 
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as participants progressed through the study, their predictions regarding the candidates’ 
performance became more similar to the model’s predictions.  However, it is worth noting that 
this effect is quite small.  Interestingly, there were several significant interactions; therefore, post 
hoc comparisons were conducted. 
All post hoc comparisons were conducted using Bonferroni corrected p-values.  There 
was a significant interaction between the cue validity and decision aid presence, F(2, 507) = 
3.566, p = .029.  The results of this interaction are displayed in Figure 8.  When the decision aid 
was not provided, there was no significant difference between the high validity (B = 0.552), the 
moderate validity (B = 0.525), and the realistic validity (B = 0.526) conditions.  Furthermore, 
when the decision aid was provided, there was no significant difference between the moderate 
validity (B = -0.652) and the high validity (B = -0.809, z = -0.729, p = .968) or the realistic 
validity (B = -0.142, z = -2.413, p = .110) conditions.  However, when the decision aid was 
provided, there was a significant difference between the high validity (B = -0.809) and the 
realistic validity (B = -0.142) conditions, z = -3.403, p = .006. 
There was a significant interaction between cue validity and trial (F(2, 507) = 4.135, p 
= .017), such that the slope of the high validity condition (B = -0.015) was significantly different 
from the slope of the moderate validity condition (B = 0.004, z = -2.527, p = .031) and 
significantly different from the slope of the realistic validity condition, B = 0.011, z = -3.550, p 
= .001.  However, the slope of the moderate validity condition was not significantly different 
from the slope of the realistic validity condition, z = -0.798, p = .704.  Finally, there was a 
significant three-way interaction between cue validity, decision aid presence, and trial (F(2, 507) 
= 7.211, p < .001).  Figure 9 displays the results of this interaction.  Post hoc analyses revealed 
that for the high validity predictors condition, the slope when the decision aid was provided (B = 
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-0.030) was significantly different than the slope when the decision aid was not provided, B < 
0.001, z = -2.931, p = .027.  Additionally, when the model was provided, the slope of the high 
validity condition (B = -.030) was significantly different from the slope of the moderate validity 
condition (B = 0.006, z = -2.888, p = .030) and significantly different from the slope of the 
realistic validity condition, B = .022, z -4.547, p < .001).  All other differences examined were 
not significant.  
Table 6 displays the parameter estimates, standard errors, and t-values for the model 
predicting the match in candidate performance predictions. 
 Cue Utilization 
Finally, in order to examine reliance on the decision aid based on how participants 
weighed the various cues, a repeated measures logistic regression was conducted using the 
generalized liner mixed-effects modeling package in R (Bates et al., 2014).  Like in study 1, the 
differences between the job candidates’ selection predictor scores (difference between cognitive 
ability for candidate A and the cognitive ability for candidate B, difference between 
conscientiousness for candidate A and the conscientiousness for candidate B, difference between 
the unstructured interview for candidate A and the unstructured interview for candidate B, and 
the difference between the handwriting analysis score for candidate A and the handwriting 
analysis score for candidate B) were used to predict the participants’ hire choice in each decision.  
Additionally, the cue validity, decision aid presence, feedback were included as predictors.  
Because it is possible that participant’s slopes may differ at each decision and as a function of 
the difference between the two candidates’ the selection predictors, multiple models were 
examined.  In order to reduce the effects of multicollinearity between the main effects and the 
interactions, the predictors were centered before being entered into the model.  The same 
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centering procedures that were used for the first and second analyses were in this final analysis.  
The differences between the job candidates’ selection predictor scores were also mean centered. 
While cue validity and feedback were originally included in the model, their effects were 
not significant.  Given the complexity of the model structure, these variables were removed to 
create a more parsimonious model and to avoid overfitting.  A summary of the structure of the 
two models examined is displayed in Table 7.  Model 6a was a significantly better fitting model 
than model 6, χ2(4) = 19.638, p < .001.  Furthermore, an examination of the fit indices suggests, 
especially the AIC, that model 6a (AIC = 8911, BIC = 9093, log likelihood = -4431) was a better 
fitting model than model 6, AIC = 8923, BIC = 9075, log likelihood = -4441.  Therefore, the 
results for model 6a are reported.  
Because the results of model 6a represent the cue weighting for a binomial choice (hire 
candidate A vs. hire candidate B), the optimal weights cannot be compared to the optimal 
weights presented in equation 5.  In order to determine if the weights participants are using 
represent optimal weighting, the same Monte Carlo simulation procedures that were used in 
study 1 were used with the addition of the addition of the handwriting analysis cue.  The 
resulting Monte Carlo simulation model yields the following optimal weighting: B = 0.189 for 
cognitive ability, B = 0.150 for conscientiousness, B = 0.038 for the unstructured interview, and 
B = 4.533*10-5 for the handwriting analysis.  Notice that these optimal weights are the same as 
the optimal weights used in study 1, with the addition of the handwriting analysis.  
The results of model 6a are displayed in Table 8.  As can be seen in the table, the 
difference between candidates’ cognitive ability scores (B = 0.043, z = 21.693, p < .001), 
conscientiousness scores (B = 0.031, z = 25.206, p < .001), interview scores (B = .018, z = 9.918, 
p < .001), handwriting analysis scores (B = 0.017, z = 11.406, p < .001), and the presence of the 
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decision aid (B = -0.249, z = -6.372, p < .001) all significantly predicted the participant’s hiring 
choice.  Furthermore, there was a significant interaction between decision aid presence and the 
difference between candidates’ handwriting analysis scores.  Specifically, when the decision aid 
was provided the slope was B = 0.014, and when the decision aid was not provided the slope was 
B = 0.020.  While this interaction is quite small, it does indicate that when the decision aid is 
provided participants provide less weight on a cue that has a miniscule relationship with 
performance.  The remaining interactions were not significant.  However, for the sake of 
comparison with study 1, Figure 10 displays the optimal cue weighting, participants’ cue 
weighting when the decision aid is provided, and participants’ cue weighting when the decision 
aid is not provided. 
As can be seen in Figure 10, neither participants in the decision aid provided nor the 
decision aid not provided conditions used a cue weighting that approximated the optimal cue 
weighting.  It does appear that participants are weighting cognitive ability more than 
conscientious and weighting conscientiousness more than either the unstructured interview or the 
handwriting analysis.  Therefore, it appears that participants are using a weighting system that 
somewhat appropriately ranks the importance of the cues.  From the figure, it does appear that 
this rank ordering of the weights is slightly better when participants are provided with the 
decision aid.  However, recall that the interaction was not significant. 
 Exploratory Cluster Analysis 
Like in study 1, an exploratory cluster analysis was conducted to examine whether there 
may be the presence of individual differences in how participants are weighting the cues.  
Specifically, the Ward hierarchical cluster analysis was conducted using the JMP Pro 12 
software for the decision aid present and decision aid not present conditions.  The results of the 
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cluster analysis are displayed in Figures 11 and 12.  As can be seen in Figure 11, four clusters 
emerged when the decision aid was provided.  The first cluster contained 36 individuals, the 
second cluster contained 68 individuals, the third cluster contained 53 individuals, and the fourth 
cluster contained 27 individuals.  From these four clusters, a clear pattern emerges.  Specifically, 
clusters 2 and 3 have different weighting for the predictors, but they have an interestingly similar 
pattern in the weighting.  Likewise, cluster 1 and 4 have different weighting for the predictors, 
but they too have an interestingly similar pattern.  In clusters 2 and 3, cognitive ability is 
weighted more than conscientiousness, which is weighted more than both the unstructured 
interview and handwriting analysis.  In contrast, clusters 1 and 4 use what approximates a unit 
weighting system with each of the predictors being weighed approximately the same.  
As can be seen in Figure 12, a four-cluster solution emerged.  The first cluster contained 
163 individuals, the second cluster contained 58 individuals, the third cluster contained 48 
individuals, and the fourth cluster contained 66 individuals.  From these four clusters, one can 
see that an almost identical pattern of weighting emerged for the four clusters when the decision 
aid was not provided as when the decision aid was provided.  Specifically, clusters 2 and 3 have 
different weighting for the predictors, but they have an interestingly similar pattern in the 
weighting.  Likewise, cluster 1 and 4 have different weighting for the predictors, but they too 
have an interestingly similar pattern.  In clusters 2 and 3, cognitive ability is weighted more than 
conscientiousness, which is weighted more than both the unstructured interview and handwriting 
analysis.  In contrast, clusters 1 and 4 use what approximates a unit weighting system with each 
of the predictors being weighed approximately the same.  Based on the results of the cluster 
analysis, it is apparent that there are individual differences in how people are weighting the 
different predictors, regardless of whether the decision aid was provided or not. 
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 Summary of Results and Discussion 
Study 2 was conducted to replicate the findings of study 1 as well as test hypotheses 4 
and 5.  All three analyses in study 2 showed that there was not a significant main effect of cue 
validity on the degree to which participants’ hiring choices and performance predictions match 
the hiring choices and performance predictions made by the model.  Therefore, hypothesis 1 was 
not supported.  In contrast, all three analyses did show a significant main effect of the presence 
of the decision aid on the degree to which participants’ hiring choices and performance 
predictions matched those made by the model, supporting hypothesis 2.  Hypothesis 3 stated that 
the presence of the decision aid would interact with the validity of the cues, such that when the 
decision aid is present and the cues are more valid, participants’ hiring choices and performance 
predictions will more closely match those made by the decision aid than in all other conditions.  
There was not a significant interaction when predicting the match in hiring choice.  However, 
when predicting similarity in performance predictions, there was a significant interaction 
between the presence of the decision aid and the validity of the cues.  Specifically, when the 
decision aid was provide and the cues had high validity, participants performance predictions 
more closely matched the predictions made by the model than when the validity of the cues was 
realistic, but not when they had a moderate level of validity.  Therefore, hypothesis 3 was only 
partially supported.  The presence of feedback was only a significant predictor when examining 
the match between participants’ hiring choices and the model’s hiring choices.  Furthermore, the 
effect was in the opposite direction than what was predicted.  Therefore, hypothesis 4 was not 
supported.  Hypothesis 5 stated that the effect of feedback on decision aid reliance would depend 
on the validity of the cues, such that when the cues are more valid and feedback is provided, 
participants’ hiring choices and performance predictions will more closely match those made by 
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the decision aid than all other conditions.  However, across all three analyses in study 2, there 
was not a significant interaction between the presence of feedback and the validity of the cues.  
Therefore, hypothesis 5 was also not supported.  
The results of the analysis examining the participants’ cue utilization were quite 
surprising and did not replicate the findings from study 1.  The results showed that there was no 
interaction between the presence of the decision aid and the cue utilization.  In fact, it appeared 
that, regardless of whether the decision aid was present or not, participants seemed to be using 
almost a unit weighting system.  An examination of the cluster analysis revealed that this is 
indeed what some groups of people were doing.  Furthermore, by using a low unit weighting 
system participants consistently underweighted the importance of cognitive ability and 
conscientiousness.  While study 2 did not replicate the cue utilization results of study 1, it is 
important to note that in some situations a unit weighting system can be useful (Dawes, 1979). 
A secondary purpose of study 2 was to increase the number of decisions participants 
made in order to better determine whether any learning effects were present.  In contrast to study 
1, there was a significant three-way interaction between the validity of the cues, the presence of 
the decision aid and trial (see Figure 9).  While there was not an explicit hypothesis regarding 
learning, this interaction provides meaningful information about how participants learned over 
the course of twenty hiring decisions.  Specifically, participants experienced the greatest degree 
of learning when the decision aid was provided and the cues were highly valid.  As the validity 
of the cues decreased, learning decreased.  When the validity of the cues was realistic, meaning 
that it resembled the validity one would expect in a real hiring context, no learning occurred over 
the twenty trials.  There are two possible conclusions from this finding.  One is that this may 
have occurred because there were too few of decisions for participants to discern any type of 
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pattern and learn from their decisions.  After all, increasing the number of decisions from ten to 
twenty allowed for participants to learn when the validity of the cues was almost perfect, R2 
= .962.  The other obvious possibility is that when the cues have realistic levels of validity (or 
even moderate validity), there may be so much error involved that people are not able to discern 
any sort of pattern.   
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Chapter 4 - General Discussion 
The purpose of these two studies was to examine the conditions under which people will 
utilize decision aids in a personnel selection context.  Specifically, this study sought to examine 
whether a) the mere presence of a decision aid will lead people to rely on the decision aid, b) the 
validity of the predictors used in the selection context influence reliance on a decision aid, c) the 
presence of feedback regarding one’s predictions of a candidate’s performance, and d) the 
interactions between these factors influence reliance on a decision aid.  In this study, the decision 
aid took the form of a statistical model that should be used to select the candidate to be hired.  In 
both study 1 and study 2, the evidence clearly demonstrated that the mere presence of a decision 
aid leads people to rely on the decision aid.  While this is not an overly profound finding, it does 
have its own merit.  By having a comparison group (those who did not receive the decision aid), 
I was able to examine whether participants were actually relying on the decision aid.  
Furthermore, by examining the cue weighting that participants used, I was able to examine 
whether a match between participants’ predictions and choices and the model’s predictions and 
choices was the result of reliance on the decision aid or the use of some alternative decision-
making strategy.  
The finding that participants rely, to some extent, on a decision aid when it is provided, 
also has practical importance.  Previous research has found that people are often resistant to 
relying on and underutilize decision aids (Arkes et al., 1986; Ashton, 1990; Dawes et al., 1989; 
Diab et al., 2011; Dietvorst et al., 2015a; Highhouse, 2008; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  The 
results of the present research suggest that in a personnel selection context, when provided with a 
decision aid people will actually utilize it, at least to some degree.  Therefore, organizations 
should provide individuals responsible for making hiring decisions with a decision aid.  While 
55 
people may not rely entirely on the decision aid when making their hiring decisions, they may 
utilize it to some degree.  This should ultimately make their performance predictions and hiring 
choices more accurate.  
A second major finding in the present research is that the validity of the cues interacts 
with the presence of a decision aid to influence reliance on the decision aid when making 
performance predictions.  In both study 1 and study 2, the validity of the cues interacted with the 
presence of the decision aid, such that there was the greatest degree of match between 
participants’ predictions of candidates’ performance and the model’s predictions of the 
candidates’ performance when the decision aid was provided and the validity of the cues was 
high.  The importance of this finding is inherent in nearly all personnel selection research.  
Specifically, personnel selection research aims to identify and develop methods of assessment 
that maximize the relationship between selection tests and future job performance.  This research 
demonstrated that reliance on the decision aid was greatest when the validity of the predictors 
was greatest.  Unfortunately, the observed validity of selection predictors more closely resembles 
the realistic validity condition (Jacobs et al., 1996; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998).  Therefore, a 
practical reason why people are hesitant to rely on decision aids is that decision aids do err.  This 
leads people to distrust decision aids (e.g., Dietvorst et al., 2015a).  This is especially apparent in 
Figure 9.  In the high validity condition, people saw the accuracy of the decision aid, which lead 
to an increase in the reliance over time.  However, in the realistic validity condition, people saw 
the decision aid err, which led to a slight (non-significant) decrease in the reliance over time.  
The third way in which decision aid reliance was operationalized was an appropriate 
weighting of the relevant predictors in making the hiring choice and performance predictions.  In 
study 1, participants who received the decision aid used cue weights that had an appropriate rank 
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ordering of the cue weights.  Further, the weights used were in the approximate numerical 
vicinity of the optimal cue weights.  Participants who did not received the decision aid used cue 
weighting that much more closely resembled a unit weighting system, and the cues were each 
weighed less than when participants did receive the decision aid.  However, in study 2, 
regardless of whether the decision aid was provided or not, participants used a weighting system 
that quite closely resembled a unit weighting system.  Further, on average, the participants’ 
weighting was lower for each predictor than in study 1.  One possibility for the differences in cue 
utilization between study 1 and study 2 is the participants.  Specifically, participants in study 2 
were required to have a minimum of one year of hiring experience in order to participate, 
whereas there was not such restriction in study 1.  Accordingly, participants’ average number of 
years of hiring experience in study 2 was 7.70 years.  Therefore, the participants in study 2 may 
be collectively considered as hiring experts.  Because participants in study 1 were not required to 
have hiring experience, the number of years of hiring experience is unknown.  However, it may 
be assumed that the participants in study 1 are not collectively considered experts.  Previous 
research has demonstrated that in some situations, such as financial forecasting, the performance 
of novice decision makers can match, and sometimes exceed, the performance of expert decision 
makers (e.g., Armstrong, 1980; Yates et al., 1991).  Interestingly, Dew, Read, Sarasvathy, and 
Wiltbank (2009) demonstrated that in entrepreneurial decision making, experts used qualitatively 
different decision-making strategies than novices, who tended to use more “by-the-book” 
strategies.  Therefore, in the present findings, the difference between the cue utilization between 
study 1 and study 2 may be the result of differences in novice versus expert decision-making 
strategies.  Indeed, it was the participants in study 1 whose cue utilization was more “by-the-
book” than the participants in study 2. 
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This research also sought to answer the call by researchers to examine the effect of 
immediate feedback on reliance on a decision aid in a personnel selection context (Slaughter & 
Kausel, 2014).  The results of study 2 showed that feedback did not have a significant effect on 
reliance on the decision aid.  Nor did feedback interact with trial, decision aid presence, or the 
validity of the cues to influence reliance on the decision aid.  This is surprising, especially given 
the three-way interaction between trial, decision aid presence, and cue validity.  The significant 
interaction would suggest that for the high validity condition, people are able to learn to use the 
decision aid when it is provided.  However, people cannot learn about the validity of the decision 
aid without feedback.  It may be the case that the form and content of feedback may influence 
the reliance on a decision aid. 
Limitations and Future Directions 
One limitation of the present research involves the nature of the task.  When asked to 
make the hiring decisions participants simply saw the information regarding the candidates’ 
scores.  This may not resemble real hiring decisions.  In real hiring decisions, managers may and 
likely do have more information regarding the candidates than simply their scores.  Furthermore, 
managers may have actually been the ones who conducted the interview (regardless of the 
structure) with the candidate.  Therefore, they would have more information than a numerical 
score.  Additionally, managers may have access to biographical data, integrity tests, background 
tests, drug tests, previous employment performance records, etc.  In the context of the present 
research, participants’ information was quite limited, which may have lowered the psychological 
fidelity of the hiring situation.  Despite this limitation, one may be able to place some faith in the 
results of this study given that the purpose of the study was to examine the factors that influence 
reliance on a decision aid.  Future research should modify this study in order to increase the 
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psychological fidelity of the research.  For example, researchers could have video recordings of 
the interviews and allow participants to rate the candidates’ performance in the interview prior to 
making their hiring choice and performance predictions.  Alternatively, future researchers should 
partner with organizations to develop organizationally specific decision aids and conduct the 
research in actual hiring contexts.   
The non-significant findings associate with feedback warrant further investigation.  As 
stated previously, in order for participants to learn the validity of a decision aid, they must have 
feedback regarding its performance.  Therefore, it may be the form and content of feedback that 
influences reliance on the decision aid.  In this research, feedback was provided regarding 
participants’ predictions only.  Feedback was not provided regarding the predictions of the 
decision aid.  Previous research has shown that providing feedback regarding the decision aid’s 
performance can lead people to distrust the decision aid, especially when people see the decision 
aid err (Dietvorst et al., 2015a).  However, previous research has not examined whether 
providing feedback interacts with the validity of the decision aid.  Therefore, future research 
should investigate whether providing feedback regarding the decision aid’s performance interacts 
with the validity of the decision aid to influence reliance on the decision aid.  Similarly, previous 
researchers have also argued that resistance to using decision aids stems from a lack of trust in 
the decision aid (e.g., Dietvorst et al., 2015a; Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).  Therefore, future 
research should actually assess participants’ trust in a decision aid and how it changes over a 
series of decisions.  
Across both studies, the results of an exploratory cluster analysis revealed that there are 
clear differences in how people are weighting the different cues.  In study 1, the clusters that 
emerged differed based on whether the decision aid was present.  In study 2, the clusters that 
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emerged did not differ based on whether the decision aid was present.  What is consistent across 
study 1 and 2 is that there are clear clusters that emerge.  This suggests the presence of individual 
difference variables that may be influencing the decision strategies that people choose to employ.  
Therefore, future research should explore which individual difference variables and under what 
conditions those individual difference variables influence participants’ weighting of cues and 
reliance on a decision aid. 
The stark difference between participants’ cue utilization in study 1 compared to study 2 
warrants investigation.  As previously mentioned, this may be the result of differences between 
the samples in terms of expertise.  Accordingly, future research should directly examine whether 
hiring novices use qualitatively different strategies compared to hiring experts.  
A final direction for future research is to examine the effects of cue validity, decision aid 
presence, and feedback over a larger number decisions and over time.  In study 1, there was no 
effect of trial.  It was only when the number of decision trials was increased to twenty was 
learning observed, and it was only observed in the high validity condition when the decision aid 
was provided.  Therefore, it is quite possible that the twenty decisions were simply not enough to 
determine whether participants in the moderate validity or realistic validity conditions are 
actually learning.  While it is possible that the amount of error in the moderate validity and 
realistic validity situations is simply too large for people to discern any type of relationship 
between the cues and the eventual performance of candidates, it is also possible that people need 
to make more decisions in order to discern the relationship.  Accordingly, future research should 
extend the number of decisions in an attempt to discover whether learning can occur in moderate 
to low validity contexts.  In a related vein, future research should examine whether people are 
able to retain the information they learned about the validity of the decision aid over time.  For 
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instance, study 2 showed that people learned that the when the decision aid has a high level of 
validity it is a useful tool, which lead people to increase their reliance on the decision aid over 
multiple decisions.  However, future research should examine the lagged effects of this learning.  
Will people continue to rely on the decision aid after some time delay, such as a week, a month, 
six months, or even a year?   
Conclusions 
This research sought to examine the effects of cue validity, presence of a decision aid, 
and feedback on reliance on a decision aid in a personnel selection context.  Simply providing a 
decision aid to people leads to reliance on the decision aid, at least to some degree.  Further, 
when the cues have high validity and the decision aid is provided, people increase their reliance 
on the decision aid over time.  Finally, it is clear that there are individual difference variables 
that influence how people weight decision cues.  
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Appendix A - Study 1 Materials 
Instructions (all conditions) 
Thanks for participating in this study.  One of the major objectives of personnel selection is to 
predict candidates’ performance based on available information. 
 
In this study, we are interested in how people make hiring decisions using limited 
information.  As such, your opinions are very important to us. 
 
The following is from a large airline company.  The firm was validating their selection 
procedures for the Ticket Agent job.  As such, more than 200 applicants took a standardized 
personality test (conscientiousness factor), standardized cognitive ability test, and completed an 
unstructured interview before being hired.  Three months after being hired, these same 
individuals were assessed by their supervisors in terms of their general performance.   
  
On the following pages, you’ll be presented with pre-hiring information of 10 pairs of 
applicants.  Based on this information, for each pair, we ask you to 
• Make a prediction of each candidate’s potential job performance as rated by his or her 
supervisor, and 
• Choose which candidate should be hired. 
  
Information about the decision aid (decision aid present condition) 
According to research examining various selection procedures, scores on standardized cognitive 
ability tests are good predictors of future job performance.  Scores on the conscientiousness 
factor of standardized personality tests are moderate predictors of future job 
performance.  Lastly, scores on unstructured interviews are weak predictors of future job 
performance.  Based on this information, one can use the following equation to estimate a 
candidate’s job performance 
  
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) = Predicted Job Performance 
  
For example, if an individual’s scores were cognitive ability = 50, conscientiousness = 100 and 
unstructured interview = 75, then 
  
0.50 x (50) + 0.40 x (100) + 0.10 x (75) = Predicted Job Performance 
25+40+7.5 = Predicted Job Performance 
72.5     = Predicted Job Performance 
  
Decision 1 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  Cognitive Ability Test Percentile Rank 
Conscientiousness Test 
Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
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Candidate A 85 95 50 
Candidate B 82 09 70 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) = Predicted Job Performance 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
42.5 + 38 + 5 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
41 + 3.6 + 7 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Decision 2 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  Cognitive Ability Test Percentile Rank 
Conscientiousness Test 
Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Candidate A 66 11 50 
Candidate B 85 07 30 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) = Predicted Job Performance 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
33 + 4.4 + 5 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
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42.5 + 2.8 + 3 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Decision 3 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  Cognitive Ability Test Percentile Rank 
Conscientiousness Test 
Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Candidate A 51 23 90 
Candidate B 41 28 30 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) = Predicted Job Performance 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
25.5 + 9.2 + 9 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
20.5 + 11.2 + 3 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Decision 4 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  Cognitive Ability Test Percentile Rank 
Conscientiousness Test 
Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Candidate A 26 73 70 
Candidate B 26 35 90 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
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0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) = Predicted Job Performance 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
13 + 29.2 + 7 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
13 + 14 + 9 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Decision 5 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  Cognitive Ability Test Percentile Rank 
Conscientiousness Test 
Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Candidate A 36 28 50 
Candidate B 46 86 70 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) = Predicted Job Performance 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
18 + 11.2 + 5 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
23 + 34.4 + 7 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Decision 6 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  Cognitive Ability Test Percentile Rank 
Conscientiousness Test 
Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Candidate A 33 35 90 
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Candidate B 12 68 90 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) = Predicted Job Performance 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
16.5 + 14 + 9 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
6 + 27.2 + 9 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Decision 7 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  Cognitive Ability Test Percentile Rank 
Conscientiousness Test 
Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Candidate A 85 95 70 
Candidate B 61 28 50 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) = Predicted Job Performance 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
42.5 + 38 + 7 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
30.5 + 11.2 + 5 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 8 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  Cognitive Ability Test Percentile Rank 
Conscientiousness Test 
Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Candidate A 09 51 30 
Candidate B 93 86 50 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) = Predicted Job Performance 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
4.5 + 20.4 + 3 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
46.5 + 34.4 + 5 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Decision 9 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  Cognitive Ability Test Percentile Rank 
Conscientiousness Test 
Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Candidate A 66 51 90 
Candidate B 04 23 30 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) = Predicted Job Performance 
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Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
33 + 20.4 + 9 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
2 + 9.2 + 3 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Decision 10 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  Cognitive Ability Test Percentile Rank 
Conscientiousness Test 
Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Candidate A 41 35 70 
Candidate B 57 35 50 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) = Predicted Job Performance 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
20.5 + 14 + 7 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
28.5 + 14 + 5 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Appendix B - Study 2 Materials 
Instructions (all conditions) 
Thanks for participating in this study.  One of the major objectives of personnel selection is to 
predict candidates’ performance based on available information. 
 
In this study, we are interested in how people make hiring decisions using limited 
information.  As such, your opinions are very important to us. 
 
The following is from a large airline company.  The firm was validating their selection 
procedures for the Ticket Agent job.  As such, more than 200 applicants took a standardized 
personality test (conscientiousness factor), standardized cognitive ability test, and completed an 
unstructured interview before being hired.  Three months after being hired, these same 
individuals were assessed by their supervisors in terms of their general performance.   
  
On the following pages, you’ll be presented with pre-hiring information of 20 pairs of 
applicants.  Based on this information, for each pair, we ask you to 
• Make a prediction of each candidate’s potential job performance as rated by his or her 
supervisor, and 
• Choose which candidate should be hired. 
  
Information about the decision aid (decision aid present condition) 
According to research examining various selection procedures, scores on standardized cognitive 
ability tests are good predictors of future job performance.  Scores on the conscientiousness 
factor of standardized personality tests are moderate predictors of future job 
performance.  Lastly, scores on unstructured interviews are weak predictors of future job 
performance.  Lastly, scores on the handwriting analysis do not predict future job performance.  
Based on this information, one can use the following equation to estimate a candidate’s job 
performance 
  
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis) = Predicted Job Performance 
  
For example, if an individual’s scores were cognitive ability = 50, conscientiousness = 100, 
unstructured interview = 75, and handwriting analysis = 65, then 
  
0.50 x (50) + 0.40 x (100) + 0.10 x (75) + 0.00 x (65)  = Predicted Job Performance 
25 + 40 + 7.5 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
72.5     = Predicted Job Performance 
  
  
81 
Decision 1 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 85 95 50 54 
Candidate B 82 09 70 62 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
42.5 + 38 + 5 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
41 + 3.6 + 7 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 2 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 66 11 50 41 
Candidate B 85 7 30 29 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
33 + 4.4 + 5 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
42.5 + 2.8 + 3 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 3 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 51 23 90 86 
Candidate B 41 28 30 18 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
25.5 + 9.2 + 9 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
20.5 + 11.2 + 3 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 4 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 26 73 70 87 
Candidate B 26 35 90 36 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
13 + 29.2 + 7 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
13 + 14 + 9 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 5 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 36 28 50 50 
Candidate B 46 86 70 51 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
18 + 11.2 + 5 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
23 + 34.4 + 7 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 6 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 33 35 90 99 
Candidate B 12 68 90 93 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
16.5 + 14 + 9 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
6 + 27.2 + 9 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 7 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 85 95 70 60 
Candidate B 61 28 50 31 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
42.5 + 38 + 7 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
30.5 + 11.2 + 5 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 8 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 9 51 30 63 
Candidate B 93 86 50 91 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
4.5 + 20.4 + 3 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
46.5 + 34.4 + 5 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 9 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 66 51 90 77 
Candidate B 4 23 30 70 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
33 + 20.4 + 9 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
2 + 9.2 + 3 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 10 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 41 35 70 61 
Candidate B 57 35 50 68 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
20.5 + 14 + 7 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
28.5 + 14 + 5 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
  
91 
Decision 11 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 66 11 50 41 
Candidate B 4 23 30 70 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
33 + 4.4 + 5 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
2 + 9.2 + 3 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 12 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 26 73 70 87 
Candidate B 61 28 50 31 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
13 + 29.2 + 7 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
30.5 + 11.2 + 5 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 13 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 33 35 90 99 
Candidate B 46 86 70 51 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
16.5 + 14 + 9 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
23 + 34.4 + 7 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
  
94 
Decision 14 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 9 51 30 63 
Candidate B 41 28 30 18 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
4.5 + 20.4 + 3 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
20.5 + 11.2 + 3 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 15 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 41 35 70 61 
Candidate B 82 9 70 62 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
20.5 + 14 + 7 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
41 + 3.6 + 7 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 16 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 85 95 50 54 
Candidate B 57 35 50 68 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
42.5 + 38 + 5 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
28.5 + 14 + 5 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 17 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 51 23 90 86 
Candidate B 93 86 50 91 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
25.5 + 9.2 + 9 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
46.5 + 34.4 + 5 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 18 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 36 28 50 50 
Candidate B 12 68 90 93 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
18 + 11.2 + 5 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
6 + 27.2 + 9 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Decision 19 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 85 95 70 60 
Candidate B 26 35 90 36 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
42.5 + 38 + 7 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
13 + 14 + 9 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
  
100 
Decision 20 
 
Below is the information for two candidates.  Use this information to predict each applicant’s job 
performance and identify which candidate the organization should hire. 
 
  
Cognitive Ability 
Test Percentile 
Rank 
Conscientiousness 
Test Percentile Rank 
Unstructured 
Interview Rating 
Handwriting 
Analysis 
Percentile Rank 
Candidate A 66 51 90 77 
Candidate B 85 7 30 29 
  
(Note: Percentile is the percentage of individuals who score less than the candidate.  For 
example, a percentile score of 50 on the cognitive ability test means that the candidate performed 
better than 50% of the other individuals). 
 
Participants assigned to decision aid condition 
Recall that the prediction formula was: 
 
0.50 x (cognitive ability score) + 0.40 x (conscientiousness score) + 0.10 x (unstructured 
interview score) + 0.00 x (handwriting analysis score) = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Based on the scores for each candidate, the formula for each candidate is: 
 
Candidate A:  
33 + 20.4 + 9 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
 
Candidate B:  
42.5 + 2.8 + 3 + 0 = Predicted Job Performance 
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Appendix C - Figures 
 
Figure 1.  Perceived versus actual effectiveness of various selection methods.  From 
“Stubborn Reliance on Intuition and Subjectivity in Employee Selection” by S. Highhouse, 
2008, Industrial and Organizational Psychology, 1, p. 334.  Reprinted with permission.  
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Figure 2.  Predicted match in hiring choice in study 1.  
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Figure 3.  Predicted match in performance predictions in study 1.  Note that the y-axis has 
been inverted to ease comparison across operationalizations of decision aid reliance. 
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Figure 4.  Cue utilization in study 1 
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Figure 5.  Cluster analysis of random effects of participants’ cue weighting when the 
decision aid is provided.  Error bars represent +/- 1 standard deviation. 
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Figure 6.  Cluster analysis of random effects of participants’ cue weighting when the 
decision aid is not provided.  Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
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Figure 7.  Predicted match in hiring choice in study 2.  
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Figure 8.  Predicted match in performance predictions in study 2.  Note that the y-axis has 
been inverted to ease comparison across operationalizations of decision aid reliance. 
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Figure 9.  Three-way interaction between cue validity, decision aid presence, and trial. Note 
that the y-axis has been inverted for ease of comparison across operationalizations of 
decision aid reliance. 
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Figure 10.  Cue utilization in study 2 
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Figure 11.  Cluster analysis of random effects of participants’ cue weighting when the 
decision aid is provided.  Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
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Figure 12.  Cluster analysis of random effects of participants’ cue weighting when the 
decision aid is not provided.  Error bars represent +/- 1 standard error. 
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Appendix D - Tables 
Table 1.  Model effects predicting match in hiring choice 
 B SEB z p 
Intercept 1.791 0.096 12.728 < .001 
Cue Validity 0.053 0.088 0.604 .546 
Decision Aid Presence 0.453 0.088 5.126 < .001 
Trial 0.025 0.026 0.963 .336 
Cue Validity * Decision Aid Presence 0.134 0.088 1.526 .127 
Cue Validity * Trial 0.042 0.026 1.587 .113 
Decision Aid Presence * Trial 0.002 0.026 0.062 .951 
Cue Validity * Decision Aid Presence * Trial 0.035 0.026 1.343 .179 
 
Table 2.  Model effects predicting match in candidate performance predictions 
 B SEB t 
Intercept 1.325 0.126 10.555 
Cue Validity -0.368 0.126 -2.932 
Decision Aid Presence -0.750 0.126 -5.970 
Trial -0.003 0.010 -0.340 
Cue Validity * Decision Aid Presence -0.307 0.126 -2.443 
Cue Validity * Trial -0.009 0.010 -0.914 
Decision Aid Presence * Trial 0.010 0.010 1.029 
Cue Validity * Decision Aid Presence * Trial 0.019 0.010 1.898 
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Table 3.  Summary of model structures examining cue utilization 
Model Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Model 3 D.Cog.Ability 
D.Conscientiousness 
D.Interview 
Decision Aid Presence 
D.Cog.Ability * Decision Aid Presence 
D.Conscientiousness * Decision Aid Presence 
D.Interview * Decision Aid Presence 
 
D.Cog.Ability 
D.Conscientiousness 
D.Interview 
Model 3a D.Cog.Ability 
D.Conscientiousness 
D.Interview 
Decision Aid Presence 
Cue Validity 
Decision Aid Presence * Cue Validity 
D.Cog.Ability * Decision Aid Presence 
D.Cog.Ability * Cue Validity 
D.Cog.Ability * Decision Aid Presence * Cue Validity 
D.Conscientiousness * Decision Aid Presence 
D.Conscientiousness * Cue Validity 
D.Conscientiousness * Decision Aid Presence * Cue Validity 
D.Interview * Decision Aid Presence 
D.Interview * Cue Validity 
D.Interview * Decision Aid Presence * Cue Validity 
D.Cog.Ability 
D.Conscientiousness 
D.Interview 
Note. D.Cog.Ability = difference between candidate A and candidate B on cognitive ability, 
D.Conscientiousness = difference between candidate A and candidate B on conscientiousness, 
D.Interview = difference between candidate A and candidate B on unstructured interview 
 
Table 4.  Model summary for determining cue utilization 
 
B SEB Z p 
(Intercept) 1.869 0.428 4.364 < .001 
D.Cog.Ability 0.158 0.028 5.718 < .001 
D.Conscientiousness 0.114 0.020 5.639 < .001 
D.Interview 0.091 0.018 5.075 < .001 
Model Presence -0.148 0.151 -0.978 .328 
D.Cog.Ability*Model Presence 0.043 0.012 3.650 < .001 
D.Conscientiousness*Model Presence 0.018 0.008 2.303 .021 
D.Interview*Model Presence 0.003 0.009 0.281 .778 
Note. D.Cog.Ability = difference between candidate A and candidate B on cognitive ability, 
D.Conscientiousness = difference between candidate A and candidate B on conscientiousness, 
D.Interview = difference between candidate A and candidate B on unstructured interview 
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Table 5.  Model effects predicting match in hiring choice 
 
B SEB Z p 
(Intercept) 1.458 .039 37.030 < .001 
Cue Validity 1 0.071 .054 1.320 .188 
Cue Validity 2 -0.006 .056 -0.100 .920 
Decision Aid Presence 0.152 .038 3.950 < .001 
Feedback -0.085 .038 -2.220 .027 
Cue Validity 1 * Decision Aid Presence 0.094 .054 1.740 .081 
Cue Validity 2 * Decision Aid Presence 0.015 .056 0.270 .791 
Cue Validity 1 * Feedback 0.059 .054 1.100 .270 
Cue Validity 2 * Feedback -0.073 .056 -1.290 .196 
Decision Aid Presence * Feedback 0.011 .038 0.300 .764 
Cue Validity 1 * Decision Aid Presence * Feedback 0.043 .054 0.800 .424 
Cue Validity 2 * Decision Aid Presence * Feedback -0.067 .056 -1.180 .237 
Note. Variables were coded using effects coding.  Cue validity 1 was coded as 1 = highly 
valid cues, 0 = moderately valid cues, -1 = low validity cues.  Cue validity 2 was coded as 
0 = highly valid cues, 1 = moderately valid cues, -1 = low validity cues.  Decision aid 
presence was coded as 1 = decision aid present, -1 = decision aid not present.  Feedback 
was coded as 1 = feedback provided, -1 = feedback not provided. 
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Table 6.  Model effects predicting match in candidate performance predictions 
 
B SEB t 
(Intercept) 1.799 .053 34.130 
Cue Validity1 -0.128 .074 -1.750 
Cue Validity2 -0.064 .077 -0.820 
Decision Aid Presence -0.534 .053 -10.130 
Feedback 0.045 .053 0.860 
Trial -0.015 .003 -4.780 
Cue Validity1 * Decision Aid Presence -0.146 .074 -1.990 
Cue Validity2 * Decision Aid Presence -0.054 .077 -0.700 
Cue Validity1 * Feedback -0.105 .074 -1.430 
Cue Validity2 * Feedback 0.076 .077 0.980 
Decision Aid Presence * Feedback 0.084 .053 1.590 
Cue Validity1 * Trial -0.015 .004 -3.510 
Cue Validity2 * Trial 0.004 .005 0.990 
Decision Aid Presence * Trial -0.001 .003 -0.260 
Feedback * Trial 0.002 .003 0.590 
Cue Validity1 * Decision Aid Presence * Feedback -0.135 .074 -1.830 
Cue Validity2 * Decision Aid Presence * Feedback 0.104 .077 1.340 
Cue Validity1 * Decision Aid Presence * Trial -0.014 .004 -3.360 
Cue Validity2 * Decision Aid Presence * Trial 0.002 .005 0.530 
Cue Validity1 * Feedback * Trial -0.009 .004 -2.000 
Cue Validity2 * Feedback * Trial 0.005 .005 1.000 
Decision Aid Presence * Feedback * Trial 0.002 .003 0.620 
Cue Validity1 * Decision Aid Presence * Feedback * Trial -0.007 .004 -1.630 
Cue Validity2 * Decision Aid Presence * Feedback * Trial 0.003 .005 0.610 
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Table 7.  Summary of model structures examining cue utilization 
Model Fixed Effects Random Effects 
Model 6 D.Cog.Ability 
D.Conscientiousness 
D.Interview 
D.Handwriting 
Model Presence 
D.Cog.Ability 
D.Conscientiousness 
D.Interview 
D.Handwriting 
Model 6a D.Cog.Ability 
D.Conscientiousness 
D.Interview 
D.Handwriting 
Model Presence 
D.Cog.Ability*Model Presence 
D.Conscientiousness*Model Presence 
D.Interview*Model Presence 
D.Handwriting*Model Presence 
D.Cog.Ability 
D.Conscientiousness 
D.Interview 
D.Handwriting 
Note. D.Cog.Ability = difference between candidate A and candidate B on cognitive ability, 
D.Conscientiousness = difference between candidate A and candidate B on conscientiousness, 
D.Interview = difference between candidate A and candidate B on unstructured interview, 
D.Handwriting = difference between candidate A and candidate B on handwriting analysis score. 
 
Table 8.  Model summary for determining cue utilization 
 
B SEB Z p 
(Intercept) 0.587 .042 13.890 < .001 
D.Cog.Ability 0.043 .002 21.693 < .001 
Decision Aid Presence -0.249 .039 -6.372 < .001 
D.Conscientiousness 0.031 .001 25.206 < .001 
D.Interview 0.018 .002 9.918 < .001 
D.Handwriting 0.017 .001 11.406 < .001 
D.Cog.Ability * Decision Aid Presence 0.003 .002 1.537 0.124 
D.Conscientiousness * Decision Aid Presence 0.001 .001 0.558 0.577 
D.Interview * Decision Aid Presence -0.001 .001 -0.963 0.336 
D.Handwriting * Decision Aid Presence -0.003 .001 -2.167 0.030 
Note. D.Cog.Ability = difference between candidate A and candidate B on cognitive ability, 
D.Conscientiousness = difference between candidate A and candidate B on conscientiousness, 
D.Interview = difference between candidate A and candidate B on unstructured interview, and 
D.Handwriting = difference between candidate A and candidate B on handwriting analysis 
 
 
